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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis aimed to analyze Sino-LAC space cooperation to answer the following 
questions: what are the motivations behind Sino-LAC space cooperation, and what do the 
parties stand to gain? How is Sino-LAC space cooperation structured, and is China 
promoting long-term technological dependencies? What challenges does this pose to U.S. 
space security, and is U.S. space policy effectively responding to regional Chinese 
proliferation within the space domain? Ultimately, LAC countries seek Chinese space 
cooperation for two primary reasons: the need to acquire Chinese-built space capabilities 
to benefit national socioeconomic development or for mutual technological development 
to achieve sovereign space autonomy. This thesis argues that in relation to the 
less-developed space nations, China uses space cooperation as one tool to control 
developing economies and as a method to exert its geopolitical influence within the 
western hemisphere. In relation to the major-developed space nations, China uses space 
cooperation to advance its space capabilities in the western hemisphere. In both cases, 
China mostly designs Sino-LAC space cooperation to foster long-term space 
engagements and potential dependencies while promoting China’s international space 
projection goals. Furthermore, this thesis concludes that a threat to U.S. space security 
due to Sino-LAC space cooperation is feasible, and that U.S. space policy is not 
appropriately implemented to predict, detect, and deter such a concern. 
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The U.S. military considers the space domain a contested, degraded, and 
operationally limited environment due to the threats posed by China, Russia, and other 
possible adversaries.1 The recent reestablishment of U.S. Space Command and the U.S. 
Space Force’s creation are responses to advancing adversarial threats and the need to 
defend space capabilities and maintain space superiority. In 2016, the Chinese government 
published its second policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It stated that 
China would actively explore space cooperation in fields such as telecommunication, 
remote-sensing, satellite data applications, and ground infrastructure.2 That same year, the 
Chinese government also published a white paper on its space activities, envisioning China 
as a space power in all respects that utilizes outer space for peaceful purposes.3 
Recent U.S. government studies have exposed how China could challenge the 
United States within the space domain via its own hemisphere. A 2019 report to Congress 
by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found that “Beijing uses 
its space program to advance its terrestrial geopolitical objectives… while also using 
diplomatic ties to advance its goals in space, such as by establishing an expanding network 
of overseas space ground stations.” 4 The report continues to warn that China’s promotion 
of launch services, satellites, and other space technologies deepens participants’ reliance 
on China for space-based services.  
 
1 U.S. Air Force, Counterspace Operations, AFDP 3–14 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. Lemay Center, 
2018), 1, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-14/AFDP-3-14-Counterspace-
Ops.pdf. 
2 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2016 
(Beijing, China: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), pt. IV, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml. 
3 China State Council, White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016 (Beijing, China: China State 
Council, 2016), pt. I, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/28/content_281475527159496.htm. 
4 Carolyn Bartholomew and Robin Cleveland, 2019 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2019), 16, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
2 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the motivations behind Sino-LAC space cooperation, and what do the 
parties stand to gain? How is Sino-LAC space cooperation structured, and is China 
promoting long-term technological dependencies with LAC countries? What challenges 
does this pose to U.S. space security, and is U.S. space policy effectively responding to the 
reality of regional Chinese proliferation within the space domain? This thesis will explore 
regional Chinese influence within the space domain, analyze if and how China’s space 
engagement builds long-term technological dependencies, and consider implications for 
U.S. space security in the western hemisphere. It will also recommend U.S. policy actions 
to deter potential space security concerns. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The end of the Cold War created a period when the United States no longer saw 
great power intervention into the LAC region as a threat to U.S. interests and national 
security. But China is now a global power capable of challenging the dominant U.S. 
position in the region; it is also no secret that the United States considers China its primary 
challenger within the space domain. Department of Defense publications and independent 
reports have emerged over the past decade that highlight the advancements of Chinese 
military space capabilities and their inherent threats to U.S. space systems architectures 
and the ability to support global warfighting efforts.  
The amount of Chinese investment and influence in the LAC region have 
reintroduced the scenario where great power competition could threaten national security 
due to declining U.S. regional influence. Previous research on Chinese-LAC space 
cooperation hinted that the subject is primarily absent from scholarly and policy literature.5 
Instead, published work on Chinese-LAC relations has focused on trade agreements, 
commodity exports, and investments between the two regions.  
 
5 Julie Michelle Klinger, “A Brief History of Outer Space Cooperation Between Latin America and 
China,” Journal of Latin American Geography 17, no. 2 (2018): 46, https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2018.0022. 
3 
Table 1 lists the eight LAC countries with a national space program, six of which 
have a history of space cooperation with China. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and 
Venezuela have well-documented space partnerships with China. The Mexican 
government announced in 2019 that a Chinese-backed multilateral space organization 
invited the Mexican Space Agency to join as a permanent member, marking the first 
example of Sino-Mexican space cooperation.6 (Yet the organization’s website still lists 
Mexico as an observer state, not a member state.)7  
Table 1. LAC countries with national space agencies against Chinese space 
cooperation.8 










The research conducted in this thesis intends to analyze Sino-LAC space 
partnerships and uncover any long-term technological dependencies behind them. 
Additionally, it will outline how these countries benefit from these partnerships and if 
China is advancing its space influence and capabilities in the western hemisphere. Finally, 
it will examine U.S. space policy and strategy to determine if the United States is postured 
to meet the growing Chinese space influence in the region. 
 
6 “Invitan a AEM a ser miembro permanente de la APSCO” [AEM is invited to become a permanent 
APSCO member], Gobierno de México [Mexican Government], accessed January 11, 2021, 
http://www.gob.mx/aem/prensa/invitan-a-aem-a-ser-miembro-permanente-de-la-apsco-199663?idiom=es. 
7 “Member States-APSCO,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, accessed August 23, 2020, 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/channel/Member_States/25.shtml. 
8 Adapted from Klinger, “A Brief History of Outer Space Cooperation Between Latin America and 
China,” 55–57. 
4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 2008, the Chinese government has published two policy papers on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. While the first policy paper did not mention space cooperation, 
it stated that China would actively carry out military exchanges and defense cooperation 
with LAC countries.9 The subsequent 2016 policy paper introduced space cooperation 
under the subject of further strengthening cooperation in the economic field.10 China stated 
it would explore cooperation in areas such as communication and remote-sensing satellites, 
satellite data applications, aerospace infrastructure, space education and training, and space 
technology to assist with domestic issues, such as disaster mitigation and agricultural 
monitoring.11 Additionally, the policy paper highlighted China’s recent South-South 
cooperation and intent at trilateral cooperation with countries and organizations outside the 
LAC region.  
A 2018 article by Julie Klinger briefly summarizes the history of outer space 
cooperation, including signed treaties and satellite projects, between China and LAC 
countries from 1984–2017.12 The article consolidates some of the bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships that are independently examined throughout this thesis. It is one of few 
examples of published work on the subject of Sino-LAC space cooperation. Klinger argues 
“that the geography of evolving China-Latin America relations cannot be understood 
without considering the role of outer space science, technology, and policy.”13 Her 
geopolitical approach to Sino-LAC space cooperation stresses the bilateral importance of 
these engagements to the advancement of environmental sciences, climate change research, 
disaster monitoring, and development projects. These engagements are key to 
 
9 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2008 
(Beijing, China: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008), pt. IV, https://china.usc.edu/chinas-policy-
paper-latin-america-and-caribbean. 
10 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 
2016, pt. IV. 
11 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pt. IV. 
12 Klinger, “A Brief History of Outer Space Cooperation Between Latin America and China,” 56–57. 
13 Klinger, 48. 
5 
understanding that the political economy of Sino-LAC cooperation is more complex than 
the commodity-based trade and investment relations found mainly in the published 
literature on general Sino-LAC partnerships.  
In her study on Sino-Latin American space cooperation, Laura Delgado-López 
illustrates how the varying national priorities of LAC countries translate into unique space 
relationships with China.14 Delgado-López argues that developing LAC countries’ 
domestic interests drive country-by-country variances in space cooperation with China. 
These regional drivers influence bilateral partnerships with China, as more LAC countries 
utilize and justify space capabilities as a development tool to deliver critical national 
services. Furthermore, she claims these apolitical Chinese partnerships are more important 
than relationships with the United States, or at least indifferent to the effect on them.15 
Delgado-López acknowledges that LAC countries have vast natural resources that China 
wants but argues that the belief that Chinese space cooperation is a lure to bring LAC 
countries under its influence is too simplistic.16 
One of the significant Sino-LAC economic cooperation programs is named China-
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-Comunidad de Estados 
Latinoamericanos y Caribeños [CELAC]), abbreviated as the China-CELAC Forum (CCF) 
in English. The CCF’s purpose is to promote the development of the comprehensive 
cooperative partnership between China and the 33 member states of CELAC.17 The forum 
proposed a 2015–2019 cooperation plan that focused on applying space technology for risk 
management, disaster prevention and reduction, evaluation of crop production, and climate 
change impacts. As of January 2020, CELAC membership has dropped to 32 states due to 
Brazil suspending its membership. 
 
14 Laura M. Delgado-López, “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation: A Smart Move,” Space Policy 
28, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 7–14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.12.009. 
15 Delgado-López, 8. 
16 Delgado-López, 9. 
17 “Basic Information about China-CELAC Forum” (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2016), 
http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/ltjj_1/P020161207421177845816.pdf. 
6 
Three major multilateral cooperation entities with space influence involving China 
and at least one LAC country are the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
(UNOOSA), the Chinese-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), and 
the economic grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Within 
UNOOSA, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was created in 
1959 to “govern the exploration and use of space for the benefit of all humanity: for peace, 
security and development.”18 COPUOS committee membership has evolved from having 
three LAC countries in 1959 to having 16 LAC members in 2019. APSCO includes the 
Republic of Peru as a member state.19 BRICS, as the acronym defines , includes Brazil. 
Between 1967–1996, COPUOS adopted five international treaties and five sets of 
principles on space-related activities.20 These well-established treaties and regulations 
make up the foundation for space law and policy. However, many states argue that gaps in 
these treaties allow an arms race to occur in outer space.21 Thus, Russia and China proposed 
a draft treaty in 2008, later updated in 2014, called the Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space 
Objects (PPWT). The PPWT recognizes that existing international agreements cannot 
entirely prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, and its approval aims to address 
this.22 A U.S. staff research report claims that China heavily supports this treaty because it 
would preserve its counter-space capabilities by allowing the continual development of 
 
18 “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
accessed August 23, 2020, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. 
19 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, “Member States-APSCO.” 
20 “Space Law Treaties and Principles,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, accessed 
August 23, 2020, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html. 
21 “Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
accessed August 23, 2020, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-
space-paros-treaty/. 
22 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space,” Space Legal Issues, May 8, 2019, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/treaty-on-the-prevention-of-
the-placement-of-weapons-in-outer-space-the-threat-or-use-of-force-against-outer-space-objects/. 
7 
ground-based counterspace measures.23 However, the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament, which has nine LAC country members, has not formally met to discuss the 
proposed treaty.24  
Under Chinese sponsorship, APSCO was established in 2008 and provides a 
multilateral cooperative mechanism for eight developing countries to facilitate resource 
sharing in space science, technology, and applications.25 In 2015, APSCO held a 
Development Strategy Forum in Beijing with the theme of “The Belt and Road Initiative 
[BRI] for facilitating space capabilities building of the Asia-Pacific countries.”26 With 
observers from Chile and Mexico, the forum concluded that the BRI conforms to the 
mission of APSCO. The BRI, much like space cooperation, is an infrastructure tool used 
by China to expand its influence and foster long-term relationships.  
The Chinese government includes space cooperation as a component of the BRI 
and often refers to these projects as the Space Silk Road or the BRI Space Information 
Corridor.27 Both a member of APSCO and the BRI, Pakistan was granted access to China’s 
BeiDou global navigation satellite’s restricted high-precision signal.28 While China claims 
the BRI has no relation to alliances in the geopolitical or military realms, BeiDou provides 
military services to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Pakistan model illustrates an 
 
23 Alexander Bowe, China’s Position on a Code of Conduct in Space (Washington, DC: U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017), 3, https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-
code-conduct-space. 
24 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “UN and CD Membership,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 14, 
2015, https://media.nti.org/pdfs/apmuncd_8.pdf. 
25 “About Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization, June 6, 2018, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/WhatisAPSCO/2018-06-06/33-144-
1.shtml. 
26 Amy Ouyang, ed., APSCO Quarterly Report (Beijing, China: Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization, 2016), http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20180309/2019030610192821583.pdf. 
27 “China Regional Snapshot: Space,” The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Republicans, March 
16, 2021, https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-space/. 
28 Bartholomew and Cleveland, 2019 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 370. 
8 
alternative to reliance on American military satellite systems.29 Access to this restricted 
Chinese space technology could extend to other organization members, within APSCO or 
the BRI, or sway observer nations to become permanent members. 
APSCO member states pledged to follow four principles and five actions to deepen 
comprehensive partnerships further. According to the 2018 APSCO Development Vision 
2030 document, the last decade produced achievements in satellite data sharing, 13 
different space science and technology projects, and professional education and training.30  
BRICS is the last of three major multilateral organizations involving China 
considered for this review, consisting of five major emerging countries and economies.31 
In its latest 2019 declaration, BRICS expressed concern about the possibility of an arms 
race in outer space and reaffirmed its stance on the peaceful uses of outer space.32 But, 
several setbacks have hindered Brazil’s space progress; it has found itself in last place 
among the BRICS countries in space development.33 Brazil may be disproportionally 
gaining a space advantage from the organization. 
Within BRICS, China’s longest-standing bilateral space-cooperation venture in the 
LAC region is the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). This agreement with 
Brazil was signed in 1988 and ultimately produced a family of six remote-sensing satellites 
utilized in sectors such as agriculture, environmental protection, forestry, and geology.34 
 
29 Rob Miltersen, “Chinese Aerospace Along the Belt and Road,” Air University, China Aerospace 
Studies Institute, June 15, 2020, 13.  
30 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, Development Vision 2030 of The Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization (APSCO) (Beijing, China: Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, 2018), 
http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20190304/2019030411022230805.pdf. 
31 “What Is BRICS?,” Brazil Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed August 23, 2020, 
http://brics2019.itamaraty.gov.br/en/about-brics/what-is-brics. 
32 “11th BRICS Summit - Brasília Declaration,” Brazil Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 
2019, https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/11th-brics-summit-brasilia-
declaration. 
33 James Clay Moltz, “Brazil’s Space Program: Dreaming with Its Feet on the Ground,” Space Policy, 
Brazil’s space program, 33 (2015): 13–19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2015.05.001. 
34 “CBERS FAQ,” Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [National Institute for Space Research], 
accessed August 23, 2020, http://www.inpe.br/faq/index.php?pai=17. 
9 
Various space organizations are responsible for different functions of the program, 
including the PLA’s China Satellite Launch and Tracking General (CLTC), which is 
dedicated to the telemetry, tracking, and command of Chinese space missions.35 
Argentina presents another example where bilateral space cooperation with China 
involves the CLTC. In 2015, as part of a controversial economic and trade agreement, the 
Argentinian Congress approved the construction and use of a Chinese-run satellite launch 
and tracking facility in Argentina’s southern Neuquén province. 36 The stated mission of 
this facility is to track Chinese unmanned missions to Mars and the Moon. However, the 
lack of Argentinian oversight prompted local opposition to speak out about the potential 
for possible military use.37 These sentiments were shared in 2019 by Admiral Craig Faller, 
the commander of U.S. Southern Command, when he stated that “Beijing could be in 
violation of the terms of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities 
and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target U.S., allied, and partner space 
activities.”38 Despite this, Argentina and China have recently resumed plans to cooperate 
in outer space exploration and exchange data and research findings between their national 
space agencies.39 This new plan diverges from the previous Argentinian administration’s 
attempts to restore U.S. relations by halting space cooperation with China. This agreement 
could increase Chinese space capabilities in the western hemisphere at the expense of U.S.-
Argentine relations. 
 
35 “China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 31, 
2013, https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/124/. 
36 Uki Goñi, “Argentinian Congress Approves Deal with China on Satellite Space Station,” The 
Guardian, February 26, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-
satellite-space-station. 
37 Goñi. 
38 Lara Seligman, “U.S. Military Warns of Threat From Chinese-Run Space Station in Argentina,” 
Foreign Policy, February 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-
chinese-run-space-station-in-argentina/. 
39 Patrick Gillespie, “China and Argentina Resume Joint Venture for Space Exploration,” Bloomberg, 
August 7, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-07/china-and-argentina-resume-joint-
venture-for-space-exploration. 
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Historically, the United States, through the U.S. Army and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), is credited with helping Chile achieve its first space 
activity milestones in the 1950s. Although Chile no longer has a national space agency, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chile’s National Commission for Scientific and 
Technological Research have established scientific collaboration.40 The result is the 
formation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ South America Center for Astronomy, 
also known as the China-Chile Joint Center for Astronomy. This institute was founded in 
2013 to develop collaboration in astronomical research between the two countries and 
serves as a space collaboration center for other South American countries. According to 
InvestChile, the national foreign investment promotion agency, plans are in the works for 
China’s first Chilean investment in science and astronomical exploration in the form of an 
astronomical observatory and an Astroscience Park.41 
InvestChile also says that Chile will be home to seventy percent of the world’s 
astronomical infrastructure within the next few years.42 Chilean officials have voiced 
concerns of an asymmetrical relationship due to China’s substantial investment and 
agreements where Chinese scientists could apply for observation time allotted to Chile at 
facilities throughout the country.43 If the projects are successful, this could open Chile to 
more substantial Chinese investment and utilization of the space domain in the western 
hemisphere. A regional framework may be established where China uses the Chilean model 
to open bilateral or multilateral agreements with other LAC nations. 
In his 2018 thesis, U.S. Air Force Captain Angel Serna examined Peru, Argentina, 
and Venezuela’s space programs and the need to engage in international space cooperation 
due to their limited indigenous capabilities and desire to become technologically 
 
40 “Overview – CASSACA,” Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy, 
accessed August 24, 2020, http://www.cassaca.org/en/news/. 
41 “Astronomy: China to Install Megaproject in Chile,” InvestChile, March 2019, 
http://blog.investchile.gob.cl/astronomy-china-to-install-megaproject-in-chile. 
42 InvestChile. 
43 Lucien O Chauvin and Barbara Fraser, “Beijing’s South American Gambit,” Nature 569, no. 179 
(May 9, 2019): 3. 
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independent.44 He further noted that the increase in global space providers created a large 
market for LAC countries to cooperate in harnessing space capabilities as a socioeconomic 
developmental tool. The strong desire to become technologically independent may create 
incentives for long-term space cooperation with China due to lower satellite program costs 
and fewer political and technical restrictions than those required by the United States. 
U.S. Air Force Major Matt Garvin’s 2014 thesis examined how international and 
domestic factors influenced national space programs in Latin America.45 His research 
discovered that the fundamental driver for determining the international orientation of these 
space programs is the desire for economic development.46 His findings appear to remain 
valid as the bilateral and multilateral space agreements between China and LAC countries 
examined are backed by massive Chinese investment and remain consistent with Delgado-
López’s school of thought. Additionally, he outlines challenges to U.S. space cooperation, 
such as export control regulations, that drove LAC countries to pursue space collaborations 
with countries like China.  
A 2018 article in the Journal of Aeronautical History reviewed space activities in 
seven South American countries.47 The article referenced the 2008 creation of a legal entity 
called the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) that consolidated many LAC 
countries to mirror the European Union organization. In 2011, the defense ministers of 11 
countries agreed to create a South American Space Agency.48 Unfortunately, governments 
could not agree on funding the creation of such an agency, but it remains a goal in the 
region. Last year, many countries withdrew from UNASUR, and a new southern bloc 
 
44 Angel E. Serna, “The U.S.-Latin America Space Cooperation Equation” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2018), 78, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58368. 
45 Matthew B. Garvin, “Launching Latin America: International and Domestic Factors in National 
Space Programs” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44569. 
46 Garvin, 98. 
47 Bruno Victorino Sarli et al., “Review of Space Activities in South America,” Journal of 
Aeronautical History 8 (September 11, 2018): 208–32. 
48 Sarli et al., 210. 
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formed without Venezuela.49 The Foro para el Progreso y Desarrollo de América del Sur 
(Forum for the Progress and Development of South America [PROSUR]) counted its 
founding members Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. This 
new right-wing political bloc committed to renew and strengthen regional integration could 
revive the work of a South American Space Agency. Without Venezuela, there could also 
exist the possibility that the United States has more potential for space cooperation with 
the PROSUR member states. 
In summary, published literature does not examine Sino-LAC space cooperation 
concerning China’s potential to entwine space partnerships into long-term technical 
engagements and dependencies. Klinger’s school of thought stresses the importance of 
multilateral space cooperation to understand the geopolitics of Sino-LAC relations. She 
highlights a long history of space-related scientific and technological exchanges and frames 
Sino-LAC nations’ relations as more profound than generally presumed. Delgado-López, 
Garvin, and Serna come to the same conclusion that domestic factors play a significant role 
in LAC countries’ need to advance native space capabilities. This school of thought leads 
to the possibility that LAC countries could leverage Chinese space cooperation to achieve 
future domestic goals despite being courted into long-term technical dependencies. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The major research question examines how China is advancing its space 
partnerships and capabilities in Latin America while broadening its long-term engagements 
and influence. Extensive Chinese investment and cooperation can create opportunities for 
LAC countries to enter into agreements to improve their technological competencies and 
aid in socioeconomic development. In return, China benefits from increasing its 
geopolitical presence and economic control in the western hemisphere by funding and 
developing space capabilities, building space infrastructure, and collaboratively sharing 
space systems and space data. 
 
49 Patricia Luna, “South American Leaders Launch New Bloc to Replace Unasur,” Associated Press, 
March 22, 2019, https://apnews.com/3cc29c66207249e18871ce8daeb56a1e. 
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China appears to select LAC countries for space cooperation based on an 
asymmetrical advantage. China enters bilateral and multilateral agreements with most of 
the investment and technological know-how to develop long-term technological 
dependencies. Research shows that more technologically developed countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil, prefer joint development and avoid asymmetrical advantages that 
result in heavy Chinese reliance. Overall, LAC countries continue to seek and gain 
substantial Chinese investment in different sectors of their space program. China 
strategically leverages Sino-LAC space cooperation as a geopolitical tool to increase its 
control of developing space economies and challenges regional U.S. space hegemony by 
providing an alternative Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperation model. 
U.S. organizations have voiced concerns regarding the space infrastructure that 
China has built, such as the facility in the Neuquén Province in southern Argentina. There 
is a global focus on the Chinese tracking station in Argentina because of the secretive 
nature of its operations and the fear of dual civilian-military use. With Chinese plans to 
develop new and expand existing space research projects throughout LAC, China will 
increase its space capabilities in the western hemisphere due to becoming the preferred 
space partner of choice. Continuous space cooperation between China and LAC countries 
may progress into programs and agreements that result in heightened U.S. concerns 
because U.S. security policy focuses heavily on the Middle East and Asia. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research conducted in this thesis will be organized into two sets of case studies. 
Using the metrics introduced by Froehlich, Soria, and De Marchi, I have categorized the 
countries listed in Table 1 into “major-developed” and “less-developed” space nations.50 
The level of development is based on the capacities and capabilities of those nations’ 
satellites. The major developed nations own satellite communication (SATCOM), Earth 
observation (EO), and scientific satellites. The less-developed nations possess capabilities 
 
50 A. Froehlich, D.A.A. Soria, and E. De Marchi, Space Supporting Latin America: Latin America’s 
Emerging Space Middle Powers (Springer International Publishing, 2020), 41. 
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in at least one sector, but not all three. This case-study structure may show causal relations 
between native space capabilities and the level of Chinese space cooperation. 
The less-developed nations include Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela. Peru and 
Venezuela are nations that have capacities in two space sectors. Mexico also falls under 
this category; however, it was not considered a case study due to its uncertain level of 
Chinese space cooperation. Peru has EO and scientific satellite capabilities and shared 
Chinese space resources due to its membership in APSCO.51 Venezuela has space 
capabilities in SATCOM and EO. Bolivia, the least space-developed nation considered, 
has purchased and only possesses SATCOM capabilities. Bolivia presents a peculiar case 
because it has comparatively limited Chinese cooperation and has not always selected 
China as its space partner of choice.52  
The major-developed space nations to be examined are Argentina and Brazil, which 
have considerable satellite capabilities in all three sectors. Brazil is said to have had 16 
SATCOM, 8 EO, and 20 scientific satellites.53 Argentina is slightly behind Brazil in 
quantity, with 8 SATCOM, 9 EO, and 10 scientific satellites, but may be more advanced 
in certain technology sectors. 
These case studies allow the thesis to focus on developmental differences in Sino-
LAC space cooperation and to determine whether China approaches cooperation with the 
same agenda and policies and how each country benefits. These case studies can be 
weighed against U.S. space security interests to determine if a credible concern exists. 
Various sources in the literature review deal with different aspects of space 
cooperation. Since the literature on Chinese-LAC space cooperation is scarce, primary 
sources will be official Chinese policies, literature on LAC space history and capabilities, 
 
51 “Data Sharing Service Platform,” Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, July 6, 2018, 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/DataSharingServiceNetwork/2018-07-06/62-184-1.shtml. 
52 Klinger, “A Brief History of Outer Space Cooperation Between Latin America and China,” 58. 
53 Froehlich, Soria, and De Marchi, Space Supporting Latin America: Latin America’s Emerging 
Space Middle Powers, 41. 
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national space program documents, bilateral and multilateral space cooperation documents, 
and various online news outlets. 
Furthermore, the U.S. government and non-governmental institutions have 
published numerous documents on space security and military doctrine. These include 
books, academic journals, congressional reports, think-tank studies, and official documents 
on space strategy and security issued by Department of Defense agencies. These documents 
will aid in analyzing the perceived threat to U.S. space dominance and provide policy 
recommendations and areas of future interest. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into four chapters. After the introduction, the 
following two chapters will attempt to show a correlation between national space 
development and the level of Chinese space cooperation in less-developed Bolivia, Peru, 
and Venezuela, and then in more-developed Argentina and Brazil. Examining these links 
should reveal what all parties hope to gain and how China combines space cooperation and 
long-term technological engagements to expand its influence in the western hemisphere. 
The fourth and concluding chapter will summarize the research, highlight findings, and 
discuss the implications on U.S. space security. Finally, it reviews U.S. space policy and 
offers recommendations to deter Chinese space security threats and strengthen and expand 
U.S.-LAC space cooperation. 
16 
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II. CASE STUDIES: LESS-DEVELOPED SPACE NATIONS 
This chapter introduces the case studies of Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela. These 
countries were selected and grouped because they each have a national space agency, a 
history of Chinese space cooperation, and “less-developed” space capabilities. This chapter 
is important because each case-study nation relied almost exclusively on Chinese space 
agreements to acquire its most advanced satellite capabilities and applications through 
different cooperation methods. This highlights a successful Chinese alternative to the 
United States for developing countries in the LAC region to acquire space capabilities to 
satisfy national development goals and advance technological competency. Space 
capabilities are becoming more affordable and accessible, and non-space fairing countries 
in the region have Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela as cooperation models to consider China 
as the space partner of choice. 
These Andean nations have long recognized the benefits of applying space 
technologies towards domestic development and regional prestige. In the 1970s, 
organizations among the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 
unsuccessfully attempted to establish a joint Andean satellite system with hopes of regional 
space sovereignty and independence from U.S. hemispheric leadership.54 Ultimately, 
Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela led independent efforts to obtain space capabilities, and 
Chinese space cooperation aligned with their national space agency’s efforts. 
Peru placed a higher emphasis on financial and technological return on investment 
when determining its space partner of choice. Peru’s comparatively stable political history 
and favorable cooperation with U.S., European, and Chinese agencies suggested a high 
level of pragmatism influenced its space program’s progression and partnerships.55 
Populist leaders and their politics played a more significant role in establishing bilateral 
Chinese space cooperation for Bolivia and Venezuela. Ex-Venezuelan President Hugo 
 
54 Mehak Sarang, “Changing Objectives in Achieving Space Sovereignty in Latin America,” in Space 
Fostering Latin American Societies: Developing the Latin American Continent through Space, Part 1 
(Springer International Publishing, 2020), 125–33. 
55 Serna, “The U.S.-Latin America Space Cooperation Equation,” 74. 
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Chávez utilized his nation’s Chinese-built communications satellite to expand his 
Bolivarian revolution to rural communities within and beyond Venezuela’s borders.56 
Similarly, ex-Bolivian President Evo Morales leveraged the successes of acquiring a 
Chinese-built national communications satellite to bolster his populist image and exploited 
the technology to broadcast his state-run propaganda. Furthermore, these Bolivian and 
Venezuelan regimes likely initiated space cooperation with China to express anti-U.S. 
sentiments.57 Consequently, China leveraged Bolivian and Venezuelan politics to increase 
its space cooperation and influence in the LAC region.  
In turn, China used space cooperation as one of its tools to advance the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) domestic, geopolitical, and global economic ambitions. Since 
the 2008 Chinese white paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, China’s official policy 
on establishing regional partnerships has depended on LAC nations recognizing Chinese 
sovereignty over Taiwan.58 Furthermore, China’s 2016 white paper on space activities lists 
drivers for sustaining space exchanges and cooperation in the LAC region. One of the white 
paper’s fundamental policies aims to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
based on common goals and serves the Belt and Road Initiative.59 Bolivia, Peru, and 
Venezuela have each signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China to join 
the BRI framework.60 Furthermore, China foresees APSCO, where Peru is a member state, 
playing an essential role in regional space cooperation in the western hemisphere. The BRI 
and APSCO are multilateral cooperation mechanisms with high potential to incorporate 
new LAC member states, helping China shape long-term technological dependencies and 
control the space economies of less-developed LAC space nations.  
 
56 Garvin, “Launching Latin America,” 84. 
57 Garvin, 84. 
58 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 
2008, pt. III. 
59 China State Council, White Paper on China’s Space Activities in 2016, pt. V. 
60 Christoph Wang, “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” Green Belt and Road Initiative 
Center, accessed September 14, 2020, https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
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A. BOLIVIA 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia is a landlocked country with a highly diverse 
geography that poses socioeconomic development challenges. The Andean region towers 
over 3,000 meters above sea level and covers twenty-eight percent of the national territory; 
the sub-Andean valley region covers thirteen percent of the territory and is characterized 
by its agricultural activity; and the plains cover fifty-nine percent of the territory and 
include the forest regions of the country.61 Bolivia estimates a national population of 
11.8 million people in 2021, with almost half of the population living in the great Andean 
plateau representing the country’s western portion. 62As a result, the topography outside 
the plateau poses many natural obstacles to domestic development and the delivery of 
essential services for more than half of Bolivia’s population. Despite being one of the 
poorest countries in the region, with sixty percent of the population living in poverty,63 
President Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, pursued a national space program 
to benefit the Bolivian people. 
1. Space Activities Overview 
Bolivia’s constitution establishes that the state is obligated to provide access to 
basic domestic services as a foundation of human rights.64 Bolivia considers 
telecommunications to include voice, data, and video, one of these basic services. 
Furthermore, Bolivia’s socioeconomic development plan states that every citizen will have 
access to all basic services by 2025. Because private companies seldom expand services to 
remote regions, the state estimates 25,000 rural towns with populations fewer than 350 are 
 
61 “Aspectos geográficos” [Geographical aspects], Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas [National 
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63 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and 
Development on the Final Frontier (New York: Routledge, 2013), 162. 
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without telecommunication services.65  The decision to acquire its own communications 
satellite was made in 2009, giving Bolivia the freedom to use SATCOM capabilities to 
achieve domestic development goals.  
The Bolivian Space Agency’s (Agencia Boliviana Espacial [ABE]) initial mission 
was to manage and implement this newfound SATCOM program, the Túpac Katari 1, or 
TKSAT-1. Bolivian law created ABE in 2010 as a strategic national public enterprise under 
the Ministry of Public Works, Services, and Housing supervision.66 Within the legal decree 
that established ABE, the Bolivian government also authorized a $250 million loan from 
the China Development Bank (CDB) to largely finance the construction and operational 
handover of a communications satellite built by the PRC’s China Great Wall Industries 
Corporation (CGWIC).67 ABE personnel received technical training in China to perform 
all satellite operations and management functions through this agreement.68 The national 
space agency’s role has expanded to include the management of national space programs 
and technical exchanges to transform ABE into a leading provider of public services.69 
Following the success of its communications satellite acquisition, ABE explored 
means to expand its space-based capabilities. However, due to shifting economic 
conditions, ABE abandoned the initiative to procure an EO satellite.70 Six prospective 
bidding nations lined up in 2014 for the estimated $100 million program, including the 
 
65 Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], 2. 
66 “¿Qué es la ABE?” [what is ABE?], Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], 
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67 “Historia” [History], Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], accessed January 21, 
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United States, Russia, France, and China.71 It is not certain if Bolivia favored a second 
Chinese contract, but multiple highly developed bidders may have signaled a pragmatic 
approach to Bolivia’s subsequent satellite acquisition. 
As a cheaper alternative, ABE settled with purchasing satellite imagery from 
foreign providers. ABE established the Earth Observation Laboratory (Laboratorio de 
Observación de la Tierra) to analyze satellite imagery and perfect the technical expertise 
needed for a future EO satellite program.72 This observatory is collocated in an existing 
satellite ground station, and it manages projects and agreements with national and 
international organizations and institutions. Imagery and products originate from but are 
not limited to NASA, European Space Agency (ESA), Japan, and Brazil.73 Similarly, a 
mobile terrestrial weather station allows access to meteorological satellite imagery.74 The 
variety of EO imagery allows ABE to provide the state with socioeconomic and 
environmental products and solutions. 
In January 2020, Bolivia unveiled its latest space capability and corresponding 
partnership with China. ABE’s La Guardia Earth Station began offering a ground-based 
service capable of monitoring and controlling new satellite deployments from launch to 
orbit utilizing the station’s existing TKSAT-1 antenna and trained personnel.75 Bolivian 
officials credit the Chinese government and companies for their contributions to the 
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services], Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], January 10, 2020, 
https://www.abe.bo/lanzamiento-del-servicio-de-estacion-terrena/. 
22 
success of the project.76 The inauguration ceremony of the Earth Station Services was 
attended by the PRC’s Ambassador to Bolivia and by CGWIC representatives to symbolize 
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) as the first company to use 
the capability. This partnership signifies a successful decade of Sino-Bolivian space 
cooperation and the likelihood for continual engagements. 
The director of ABE reported that TKSAT-1 generated $100 million in revenue 
after five years.77 With a 15-year satellite life span, the $302 million satellite program78 
will ultimately pay for itself. The director further stated in 2019 that the satellite would 
reach its practical occupational limit, roughly eighty-five percent of its maximum capacity, 
by the end of the year.79 The success of TKSAT-1 led Bolivia to consider acquiring a 
second communications satellite. ABE delivered a 2018 press release highlighting the 
process of approving the Túpak Katari II, with 10 times its predecessor’s capacity at the 
cost of $250 million.80 Hopes for a proposed 2021 launch have vanished, and it is unclear 
where in the acquisition process this program currently rests.  
a. Satellite Operations 
Acquiring a high-tech satellite is a common route to propel a developing space 
agency into the modern age of space capabilities. In 2013, Bolivia entered that realm after 
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receiving the first signals from its Chinese-built TKSAT-1 communications satellite.81 
President Morales witnessed the launch on December 21, 2013, from China’s Xichang 
Satellite Launch Center.82 The contract with CGWIC provided Bolivia with services 
beyond the construction, launch, and satellite handover. The package solution included 
ground control stations, satellite application systems, technical training, and orbit and 
frequency management.83 Three years after creating Bolivia’s space agency, China 
deployed the turn-key satellite platform, a feat unquestionably impossible for Bolivia to 
accomplish on its own. 
The SATCOM capabilities of TKSAT-1 became operational a few months after 
launch. The satellite operates in four different frequencies, enabling business and domestic 
services to reach remote and disperses areas within Bolivia and throughout the South 
American continent.84 TKSAT-1 delivers voice, data, and video communication services, 
prioritizing satellite internet and television. Dozens of satellite television channels are 
freely available to anyone with a television and a $40 satellite receiver kit.85 Though, 
Bolivia guarantees satellite access to citizens that cannot afford service costs via free public 
centers. Thousands of these community technology centers have been built in remote rural 
areas with programs to promote economic growth, networking, and training 
opportunities.86   
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Command and control of TKSAT-1 is accomplished via two Bolivian satellite 
ground stations, the Amachuma station in La Paz and the La Guardia station in Santa Cruz. 
Chinese on-site support operators assisted until March 2016, but ABE personnel have been 
entirely responsible for all aspects of daily satellite operations since then.87 Bolivia owns 
both stations, and Bolivian companies constructed them; however, Chinese contractors 
defined the technical specifications.88 Additionally, the Amachuma ground station includes 
a telecommunications port that serves as a hub to provide services to various other public 
and private clients.89 As a result, Bolivia can use TKSAT-1’s capabilities to generate 
commercial income while providing free services to meet domestic promises. 
2. Sino-Bolivian Space Cooperation 
Since ABE’s inception, Chinese space cooperation has been an integral part of 
Bolivia’s national space program’s evolution. Bilateral space cooperation with China 
officially began in 2010 with the signing of the MoU to develop TKSAT-1.90 Bolivia 
signed the $300 million CGWIC contract to construct and deliver the communications 
satellite package the following year, eighty-five percent of which was funded by the CDB’s 
loan.91 Three years later, Bolivia operationally accepted TKSAT-1 and had the national 
means to command and control the satellite via two ground stations with expertly trained 
ABE personnel.  
CGWIC’s package deal allowed Bolivian professionals to receive training from 
Chinese space experts. Bolivia initially sent 64 ABE technicians to China in 2012 to train 
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in the technical and management aspects of TKSAT-1 and other space technologies.92 
Then, in 2013, 10 more ABE technicians went to China to learn telecommunications port 
engineering and operations.93 China also assists in the training and education of students 
involved in the aerospace fields. In 2016, ABE developed the country’s first specialized 
study program in space application, utilizing partnerships and technology transfers 
between Bolivia’s Mayor of San Andres University and CGWIC.94 Additionally, 
scholarships for a Master’s program in Space Technology Applications (MASTA) and a 
Doctoral Program on Space Technology Applications (DOCSTA) are available through 
ABE and hosted at Beihang University, previously known as the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics.95 These postgraduate programs specialize in microsatellite 
technology, space systems and operations, and space law and policy.  
3. Analysis 
The acquisition of TKSAT-1 provided Bolivia with immediate cost-cutting 
benefits, nationalistic pride, the means to fulfill its constitutional obligations and meet 
national socioeconomic development goals. Within four years of establishing ABE, Bolivia 
successfully expanded SATCOM services to thousands of neglected rural communities and 
most of the LAC region. China played a fundamental role in developing Bolivia’s national 
space program. In turn, ABE’s director stated to continue deepening the pragmatic 
cooperation between China and Bolivia within the Chinese Space Silk Road framework.96 
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A decade following ABE’s foundation, the future of Sino-Bolivian space cooperation 
remains linked with ongoing partnership programs.  
During this boom period of Sino-Bolivian space cooperation, U.S. relations with 
Bolivia heavily declined. In recent years, President Morales accused the United States of 
undermining his presidency and expelled the U.S. ambassador, U.S. law enforcement, and 
development cooperation agencies, and terminated U.S.-Bolivia bilateral investment 
treaties.97 The United States Agency for International Development suspended assistance 
in 2013, ending a 50-year, $2 billion legacy of improving Bolivian citizens’ lives. In 
contrast, between 2009–2020, state-run Chinese banks loaned an estimate of $3.4 billion 
to the Bolivian government and state-run enterprises98 for development and infrastructure 
projects valued at $5.1 billion.99 Nearly all projects were categorized under the BRI 
framework, including the TKSAT-1 satellite program. 
With his left-wing populism and strong desire to empower Bolivia’s poor and 
indigenous population, President Morales’ political ideals aligned with China’s policies 
towards the LAC region. Official Bolivian narrative states that “Bolivia and China enjoy a 
cooperative, “horizontal” relationship based on their complementary economic needs and 
shared political worldview.”100 Although Morales was removed from power after the 
controversial national elections of 2019, his 14-year presidency and successful Movement 
Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) party platform led to the 2020 election of a 
new president loyal to the Morales’ regime. Under continual socialist party leadership and 
declining U.S. relations, Bolivian politics may be a strong factor in defining China as its 
partner of choice for space cooperation. 
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The Republic of Peru is an Andean nation with a South Pacific coastline and 
borders five South American countries. Roughly one-third of its estimated 32.2 million 
population resides in the western coastal plains, one-half in Andean highlands.101 The 
remainder is spread along the eastern Andean slope and among the jungles of the Amazon 
basin. Peru experienced favorable economic circumstances between 2004–2013,102 
allowing the government to take a significant step in developing its national space program 
by acquiring its first national satellite. A dramatic decline in poverty and unemployment 
over the last decade has improved Peru’s domestic conditions, and its economy is one of 
the best performing in the region.103 Although it is challenging to quantify space 
capabilities’ contributions to Peru’s socioeconomic success, the nation’s enduring history 
of space advancements and partnerships indicates a future of long-lasting international 
space cooperation. 
1. Space Activities Overview 
Peru officially entered the national space scene on June 11, 1974, with the passage 
of a law that created the National Commission of Aerospace Research and Development 
(Comisión Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo Aeroespacial [CONIDA]) to serve as 
the Peruvian national space agency. CONIDA’s mission is to utilize science and space 
technologies to generate products and services that contribute to the nation’s 
socioeconomic development and security.104 It aims to place Peru as a regional space leader 
and a prominent presence in the international space community.  
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The Peruvian space agency’s technical branch is structured into five sub-divisions 
to achieve its national space objectives. Two divisions handle CONIDA’s space education 
and observational research.105 The Space Studies Directorate (Dirección de Estudios 
Espaciales) promotes nationwide space education and interfaces with foreign and domestic 
institutions and companies to develop specialized training and programs. CONIDA’s 
Astronomy and Space Sciences Directorate (Dirección de Astronomía y Ciencias 
Espaciales [DIACE]) carries out broad electromagnetic spectrum research and develops 
and implements scientific instrumentation.106 DIACE operates two Peruvian space 
observatories and one weather station with remote instrumentation capable of studying 
solar and atmospheric phenomena from Antarctica.107  
Three divisions utilize space capabilities to directly support domestic development. 
The Space and Geomatics Applications Directorate (Dirección de Aplicaciones Espaciales 
y Geomática [DIAPG]) performs geospatial research and development for national and 
international community benefits.108 Specifically, this division produces a diverse range of 
products for Peruvian institutions using satellite imagery. For example, a DIAPG analyzed 
imagery from multiple satellites from 2017–2019 to estimate Peruvian coca cultivation 
across the country’s geographically varying districts.109 DIAPG also partnered with the 
Peruvian national emergency center to aid with natural disaster preparation and response. 
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The Space Technologies Directorate (Dirección de Tecnología Espacial [DITEC]) 
develops and advances the nation’s rocket program and satellite technologies.110 The 
National Center for Satellite Imagery Operations (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de 
Imágenes Satelitales [CNOIS]) operates the nation’s EO satellite imagery system, 
PerúSAT-1, which supports national development, security, and defense. Together, DITEC 
and CNOIS develop and acquire the space technology and personnel expertise required to 
transform Peru into a major regional space power. 
According to a former head of CONIDA, 20 Peruvian public institutions purchased 
satellite imagery to carry out their functions before PerúSAT-1.111 Between 2011 and 2015, 
these institutions spent the equivalent of $570,000 to purchase an average of 38 images per 
year. Since the operational handover of PerúSAT-1 from Airbus in December of 2016,112 
CONIDA has provided free satellite images to these institutions and other registered 
users.113 CNOIS reported that over 76,000 images were distributed across 574 users 
between January 2017 and October 2020.114 Furthermore, the report claims that PerúSAT-
1 has saved its users over $1.28 billion compared to the cost of purchasing foreign satellite 
imagery. At that rate, the Peruvian government recovered PerúSAT-1’s $211 million 
contract cost115 in the first year of satellite operations alone. 
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a. Launch Capabilities 
The launch base Punta Lobos, located south of Lima on Peru’s coast, was 
established shortly after the foundation of CONIDA. Operated by the Peruvian Air Force, 
Punta Lobos was extensively used between the 1970s and 1990s by NASA, among other 
foreign research organizations, to conduct sounding-rocket atmospheric research.116 Peru 
only participated in this collaborative project in a supporting role, but the collaboration 
prepared Peru to develop its national rocket program. 
A joint venture between CONIDA and the Peruvian Air Force produced the 
nation’s first sounding rocket. Named Paulet I, this sounding rocket was launched from the 
Puta Lobos launch facility in December 2006 and carried scientific devices that measured 
upper-atmospheric conditions.117 The follow-on rocket, Paulet 1M, was successfully 
launched in September 2009. In September 2011, CONIDA launched an experimental 
sounding rocket named X-PAX-II,118 which paved the way for the June 2013 launch of the 
Paulet 1B, lauded as Peru’s first rocket built exclusively with indigenous technology.119 
CONIDA continues to advance its rocket program through DITEC and plans to 
launch its next generation of sounding rockets in the near future. The proposed Paulet 1C 
and Paulet 1D sounding rockets are estimated to reach an altitude of 120 kilometers using 
an upgraded rocket-propulsion system.120 The sustained development of Peruvian rocket 
and instrumentation technology signals that Peru may soon develop the equipment 
necessary to reach low-Earth orbit and advance its rocket program towards the sovereign 
ability to access and utilize space freely. 
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b. Satellite Production 
Peruvian academic institutions led the nation’s research in satellite development 
and fielded four small scientific satellites in the last eight years. Teachers and students from 
the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) 
developed the first two satellites.121 The PUCP-Sat-1 and Pocket-PUCP launched from 
Russia’s Dombarovsky Air Base on November 21, 2013.122 The smaller Pocket-PUCP 
payload was deployed 15 days later from PUCP-Sat-1 on December 6, 2013.123 Together, 
these satellites monitor environmental conditions and calculate time and distance to orbit 
the Earth. 
Two other universities produced the final two Peruvian scientific satellites launched 
in 2014. Students and professionals from Alas Peruanas University (Universidad Alas 
Peruanas) developed the UAPSAT-1 to monitor satellite telemetry and environmental 
conditions using amateur radio broadcasts.124 NASA launched the satellite in January 2014 
from its Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. The fourth and final Peruvian-built satellite 
was based on a Stanford University CubeSat design and constructed by students at Peru’s 
National Engineering University (Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería).125 Chasqui-I was 
hand-released by a Russian Cosmonaut in August 2014 during an International Space 
Station spacewalk.126 Chasqui-I was an imaging satellite designed to take EO photos from 
low-Earth orbit.127 One source reported that the satellite passed validation tests at the 
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university and later Russia;128 however, two sources concluded that Chasqui-I produced no 
post-launch data129 due to the absence of satellite downlink signals.130 Despite the efforts 
by Peru’s civil educational institutions, CONIDA has not expressed interest in the 
indigenous development of a national satellite. 
c. Satellite Operations 
Peru entered the modern age of space capabilities when it acquired its high-tech EO 
satellite. Following a government-to-government agreement with France,131 CONIDA 
partnered with Airbus Defense and Space and signed a 2014 contract in which the French 
company developed PerúSAT-1 for the Peruvian space agency.132 The agreement included 
an Airbus-built image analysis and processing center and training for 50 Peruvian 
engineers in satellite construction and image analysis.133 The satellite was launched from 
Kourou, French Guiana, on September 16, 2016, and is controlled and operated by 
CONIDA members via the CNOIS satellite ground station near Lima, Peru.134 This station 
can manage all of PerúSAT-1’s satellite functions, including status monitoring, 
commanding, image processing, and registered external user requests.135 In addition, the 
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Airbus Defense and Space contract gave CONIDA access to request and download images 
from six other French-built EO satellites.  
The capabilities derived from PerúSAT-1 align with Peru’s domestic and strategic 
objectives. Airbus states that PerúSAT-1’s 70-centimeter very-high-resolution optical 
imager is capable of both civil and military applications. These applications range from 
“homeland security and border monitoring, coastal surveillance and the fight against illegal 
trafficking to mining, geology, hydrology, disaster management, and environmental 
protection.”136 PerúSAT-1 originated as a Peruvian national public investment project 
designed to provide national benefits in defense, agriculture, mining, and forestry.137 
PerúSAT-1’s capabilities deliver products throughout the Peruvian government, non-profit 
agencies, academic institutions, the press, and the general public. Collaboration with state 
institutions has helped detect irregularities in public works, drug trafficking intelligence, 
response to natural disasters, tracking of deforestation, and generation of national 
cartography.138 DIAPG generated reports to the Peruvian Ministry of Health on the status 
of public compliance to pandemic restrictions utilizing PerúSAT-1 imagery.139 Peru 
continues to find innovative ways to apply satellite imagery to achieve domestic objectives 
and validate its space-capabilities investments. 
2. Sino-Peruvian Space Cooperation 
Unlike Bolivia and Venezuela, which cooperate bilaterally with China on space 
programs, Peru is engaged in multilateral Chinese space cooperation. APSCO “provides a 
cooperative mechanism for developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region to be able to 
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mainstream peaceful uses of space as a driver of development.”140 APSCO’s founding nine 
members signed the Convention of APSCO in 2005 and 2006: Bangladesh, China, 
Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey. Indonesia failed to ratify 
the protocols set forth by various national governments, and thus APSCO was inaugurated 
in December 2008 with the remaining eight nations as member states.141 The convention 
defines the PRC as APSCO’s host government,142 clearly cementing China’s leadership 
role within the organization. 
APSCO’s key fields of operations comply with Peru’s desire to utilize space and 
advance its native capabilities for domestic development. These fields of cooperation 
include space technology and applications, such as EO, environmental management, 
SATCOM, navigation and positioning, centralized space-data banks, education, and 
training.143 Article 7 of the Convention of APSCO lists the basic activities all dues-paying 
member states shall participate in, and Article 8 allows for participation in optional 
activities.144 Peru plays a role within some of these fields of cooperation and activities as 
follows.  
One of CONIDA’s observatories is situated in the mountainous Huancayo region 
of central Peru. DIACE manages this space observation center, and its instruments include 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) monitoring equipment145 and a 15-centimeter-
aperture electro-optical telescope.146 The monitoring equipment is part of APSCO’s 
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International GNSS Monitoring and Assessment (IGMA) project that promotes 
understanding and cooperation of GNSS monitoring among APSCO member states. The 
Space Technology Applications Network, one of six APSCO cooperative programs, 
initiated the IGMA project.147 The telescope is part of the Asia-Pacific ground-based 
Optical Space object Observation System (APOSOS) and is the prioritized project of a 
second APSCO cooperative program called the Ground-Based Optical Space Object 
Observation Network. 
APOSOS is a multilateral SSA program designed to track space objects. Peru is 
one of three global APOSOS observation nodes; Pakistan and Iran have identical 15-
centimeter-aperture telescopes.148 The SSA network aims to track and acquire astrometric 
measurements of space objects owned by APSCO members. It can also track any item with 
a diameter as small as 10 centimeters in low Earth orbit (LEO) or one meter in 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Observational data is routed to the Data and Operation 
Management Center in the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical 
Observatory. The center is also responsible for network coordination, observation 
schedule, orbit determination, and more.149 Heavy Chinese investment in APOSOS has 
resulted in predominantly Chinese management of the program. 
The third cooperative program that Peru contributes to is the Education and 
Training Center (ETC) Network. To facilitate the frequent exchange of information and 
knowledge among member states, APSCO has commissioned an ETC in all member-state 
locations.150 The ETC center in APSCO’s headquarters in Beijing serves as the educational 
focal point for online distance education. Peru led online courses as recently as October 
2020, when a Peruvian Air Force engineer taught an introductory satellite subsystems 
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course to APSCO members.151 In return, CONIDA members and Peruvian students have 
participated in numerous APSCO-sponsored technical training courses, Chinese higher-
education resident programs such as MASTA and DOCSTA, international symposiums, 
and microsatellite competitions.152 Peru’s small contribution to the ETC Network is a high 
return on investment due to the immense opportunities provided by China’s host role in 
APSCO.  
The Disaster Monitoring Network is a fourth cooperation program to which Peru 
directly contributes into. Its objective is to optimize best practices for disaster monitoring 
and rescue operations among APSCO member states.153 Basic activities within this 
network include programs that integrate satellite and ground observations for earthquake 
signatures and precursors, such as ground-based ionosphere monitoring and space-based 
electromagnetic observations.154 Other disasters of concern to the Asia-Pacific region are 
droughts, forest fires, and various storms. APSCO’s website describes these programs as 
running smoothly under the leadership of Chinese government institutions.155 
The remaining two APSCO cooperative programs rely almost exclusively on 
Chinese investment due to Peru and other member states’ absent capabilities. APSCO’s 
Data Sharing Network was initiated in 2012 to meet member state demands for a wide 
range of satellite imagery.156 By April 2014, the Data Sharing Service Platform was fully 
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operational and ready for member states to request images. China is the sole provider of 
the platform’s data via a constellation of nine Chinese EO satellites.157  
Finally, the Space Segment Network and Interconnection of Ground Systems 
program utilize APSCO’s joint Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) constellation as a 
platform for member states to receive shared satellite data.158 Despite calling it a joint 
program, China is currently the sole contributor, launching the first participating satellite 
in 2008159 and providing the current SMMS constellation with three on-orbit imaging 
satellites.160 Peruvian socioeconomic development benefited from the SMMS program’s 
start because APSCO was a source of CONIDA’s procured foreign satellite imagery before 
acquiring PerúSAT-1.161  
Peru possibly may not include PerúSAT-1 into the SMMS constellation, or any 
APSCO cooperative program, due to probable agreements with Airbus Defense and Space. 
A summary of space objects owned by APSCO member states reveals that Peru owns two 
active satellites while China owns 253 of the remaining 283.162 Therefore, every space 
segment of an APSCO cooperation program will depend on heavy Chinese investment and 
contribution. Peru, and many non-Chinese member states, can only contribute to APSCO’s 
objectives via the ground segment of space programs and through exchanges of education 
and training. 
3. Analysis 
Long-term Chinese space cooperation through APSCO may define CONIDA’s 
preferred method for future space engagement. Although China did not bid during 
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PerúSAT-1’s official request for proposal,163 despite five years of APSCO cooperation at 
the time, Peru signaled the significance of Airbus’ commitment to training dozens of 
Peruvian engineers during satellite development.164 In addition, the partnership with 
France provided Peru with long-term opportunities for EO capacity development and 
technology transfer. China offers Peru similar domestic development opportunities through 
APSCO but expands shared technical capabilities, training, and educational programs 
beyond one type of space system.  
The framework for future Chinese-led multilateral space cooperation was published 
in the APSCO’s Development Vision 2030 document. APSCO aims to significantly 
enhance its member states’ space capabilities to realize “the Asia-Pacific dream of common 
development, prosperity, and improvement.”165 The goals, priorities, and objectives 
outlined in the 2018 document concentrated on resource sharing, capacity building, and 
talent cultivation to enable member states to benefit from space technology’s 
socioeconomic applications. Overall, APSCO has launched 13 joint research projects, 
recruited 250 master’s and Ph.D. candidates, and trained over 1,000 technicians.166 Since 
China provides most of the organization’s resources, Peru benefits from maintaining this 
long-term cooperation if China can continue sponsoring it. 
China expands its ground-based space capabilities from Peru’s membership in 
APSCO and utilizes space cooperation as a tool to advance its geopolitical and economic 
ambitions. Western hemisphere access to Peruvian ground stations provides China with 
expanded BeiDou satellite monitoring and near-full SSA coverage in GEO and LEO. 
APSCO is a permanent observer at COPUOS and participates in all meetings, including 
legal and technology subcommittees,167 presenting China with an additional international 
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forum to promote its agenda. China’s white paper on its space activities in 2016 highlighted 
APSCO’s strategy alignment with the BRI for “Facilitating Regional Capacity Building of 
the Asia-Pacific Countries.”168 The paper also called for creating the BRI Space 
Information Corridor, distinguishing space-related development projects from the broader 
BRI framework.  
As the only LAC member state of both APSCO and the BRI, Peru is a unique model 
for Chinese space cooperation in the region. Although Peru acquired its EO satellite 
through an agreement with France, China invested heavily and is continuously advancing 
Peru’s ground-based space capabilities, personnel training, and shared space data and 
applications. APSCO is an example of a successful multilateral alternative to U.S. space 
cooperation, and its membership promotes long-term space engagements in the LAC 
region. 
C. VENEZUELA 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is South America’s northernmost Andean 
nation bordered by Colombia, Brazil, Guyana, and the Caribbean Sea. Most of the 
country’s 30 million inhabitants are concentrated in the northern and western highlands 
along the north end of the Andes Mountain range.169 The urban population accounts for 
almost ninety percent of the total population, leaving roughly 3 million scattered in remote 
and rural regions. Once a relatively stable democracy and one of Latin America’s fastest-
rising economies, Venezuela’s oil-export-dependent economy has declined since the 
1980s, and its democratic institutions have devolved to authoritarian rule.170 It is now 
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estimated that ninety-six percent of Venezuela’s population live in poverty, and seventy 
percent live in extreme poverty.171  
Venezuela’s leftist authoritarian rule began in 1999 with the late ex-president Hugo 
Chavez and now continues with Nicolas Maduro, both of whom have outspokenly 
denounced and criticized the U.S. government and its foreign policies. Venezuela created 
a national space agency during this period of economic decline and political instability and 
acquired Chinese-built space capabilities. Negative U.S. relations opened the opportunity 
for China to become Venezuela’s space-cooperation partner of choice. This close 
association of two U.S.-challenging regimes in the LAC region may contest U.S. space 
security and further CCP interests from within the hemisphere. 
1. Space Activities Overview 
Venezuela’s National Constitution of 1999 served as its first legal framework for 
developing its space activities. It established Venezuela’s rights in outer space, recognized 
the value of outer space as a common heritage of mankind, and affirmed compliance with 
established international space agreements.172 Additionally, Venezuela could now 
participate in international space forums, such as the United Nations, to coordinate space 
activities following international law. The Venezuelan government then created relevant 
institutions to manage the nation’s indigenous space efforts. 
A national body dedicated to developing space activities was formed in 2004 and 
is credited with beginning Venezuela’s space history.173 This commission paved the way 
for creating Venezuela’s national space agency, the Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities 
(Agencia Bolivariana para Actividades Espaciales [ABAE]), in 2007. ABAE was 
structured under the Ministry of Science and Technology. Its philosophies were driven by 
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the advancement of society, the development of space capabilities through human training 
and technology transfer, and the establishment of international cooperation.174 
Guided by the country’s National Plan for Science Technology and Innovation 
2005–2030, ex-President Chavez aligned the social and economic developments that space 
capabilities contribute to with his Bolivarian socialist agenda.175 Adherence to the peaceful 
use of outer space served as the main principle that drove the development and growth of 
its space capabilities to satisfy social needs, support national programs, promote regional 
integration and cooperation, and prioritize technology transfer and human training.176 
Thus, Venezuela advanced its space program to acquire SATCOM and EO capabilities, 
despite its troubled political and economic institutions. 
a. Satellite Operations 
ABAE acquired its first space capability through a communications satellite 
program called VENESAT-1. In November 2005, Venezuela signed a bilateral contract 
with China to manufacture and launch a satellite named Simón Bolívar, to construct ground 
control stations, and to train Venezuelan personnel.177 The SATCOM payload operated in 
three frequencies and provided Venezuela and the continent with radio, TV, and data 
access.178 The ground segment was managed and operated by ABAE personnel and 
consisted of a primary control station inside a Venezuelan military base and a backup 
facility in a different region. The satellite was launched from a Chinese space center in 
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October 2008, and although it had an estimated 15-year lifespan, it suffered an early 
mission-ending mechanical failure in March 2020.179 
Access to the regional services provided by the VENESAT-1 program improved 
existing applications that strengthened social development. Among these examples, 
telemedicine programs were expanded to rural areas and increased real-time interaction 
and response times.180 VENESAT-1 also increased environmental monitoring data transfer 
to aid with disaster management and biodiversity conservation. Additionally, because most 
of Venezuela’s population and development is concentrated in the north, poverty was 
reduced in the remote southern regions due to new communication infrastructure that 
promoted economic and educational growth. According to Venezuela’s national 
telecommunications company, ninety percent of the satellite’s capacity is used for mass 
social services.181 The early success of the VENESAT-1 program encouraged the country 
to continue its bilateral space cooperation with China to acquire and expand its space 
capabilities.  
Venezuela distinguished itself from the other less-developed space nation case 
studies because it successfully acquired a second satellite capability. In May 2011, 
Venezuela signed a contract with CGWIC to develop and launch Venezuela’s first EO 
satellite.182 The Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite program, or VRSS-1, included the 
Miranda satellite, ground infrastructure, technology transfer, and human training. Miranda 
was launched in September 2012, and its applications include environmental management, 
urban planning, disaster management, scientific research, defense, among others.183 All 
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ground and satellite functions, including data processing and distribution, are performed 
by ABAE personnel. 
Direct access to satellite imagery allowed Venezuela to freely share valuable data 
with a variety of national users. In September 2020, Miranda celebrated 8 years of 
operational use and distributed more than 58,000 images to public, private, national, and 
international organizations and institutions.184 In addition, ABAE created basic courses and 
seminars to promote its space capabilities so that more of the population is aware of the 
benefits and the use of satellite imagery.185 The success of Miranda facilitated the 
acquisition of a second Chinese-built EO satellite, the VRSS-2 program. 
Venezuela signed a second EO satellite cooperation agreement with China in 2014, 
and the Sucre satellite was launched in October 2017.186 Sucre’s upgraded sensors provided 
higher resolution compared to Miranda and included the addition of an infrared camera.187 
Both satellites were placed in the same orbit with a phase of 180 degrees of separation for 
improved revisit and image acquisition. Sucre’s capabilities complemented and improved 
Miranda’s contribution to Venezuela’s national and social development; as of June 2021, 
both satellites have captured over one million images and increased the technical expertise 
of ABAE personnel.188 
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2. Sino-Venezuelan Space Cooperation 
Bilateral cooperation with China is directly responsible for the achievements and 
advancements of Venezuela’s national space capabilities and technological competency. 
Venezuela’s national mandate states that all bilateral agreements must include SATCOM, 
EO, and scientific space program development, capacity building, personnel training, and 
technology transfer.189 Furthermore, Venezuelan space cooperation efforts have 
emphasized South-South cooperation with countries that share those foreign policy 
principles.190 Since 2005, China has satisfied Venezuela’s requirements for space 
cooperation and continues to build a strong partnership based on mutual interests.  
China and Venezuela have signed five cooperation agreements associated with the 
peaceful use of outer space. They include the satellite programs VENESAT-1, VRSS-1, 
VRSS-2, the creation of a Venezuelan space research and innovation center, and the 
establishment of a space science and technology training center in China.191 A unique joint 
work methodology model allowed Venezuelan staff to actively participate in all phases of 
the VRSS-2 program, allowing ABAE personnel to gain in-depth knowledge of satellite 
production.192 These Venezuelan milestones were realized through bilateral cooperation 
agreements with CGWIC and CASC. Based on these strong relationships, a VENESAT-2 
program may soon become the sixth cooperation agreement due to VENESAT-1’s recent 
on-orbit failure. 
Bilateral cooperation also exists between both country’s national space agencies. 
ABAE and China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) signed an agreement to 
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exchange remote sensing satellite data and satellite applications.193 A virtual constellation 
was formed with Venezuela’s VRSS satellites and China’s Gaofen EO satellites, allowing 
both countries to access satellite imagery from the constellation. In 2017, Venezuela’s 
satellite ground station successfully conducted the first data receiving test from a Chinese 
Gaofen satellite. CGWIC stated the test was an implementation of the space agreements 
signed between CNSA and ABAE and an implementation of the BRI framework.194 This 
statement aligns with China’s intent outlined in its 2016 policy paper on LAC and is 
consistent with China’s practice of space cooperation within the BRI Space Information 
Corridor framework in Latin America.  
3. Analysis 
Despite Venezuela’s early attempt at space cooperation with South American 
countries, China emerged as the dominant space partner of choice in the mid-2000s. 
ABAE’s partnerships with Chinese space corporations enabled the acquisition of three 
satellites, the construction of satellite ground stations, and the technical training of over 
200 ABAE personnel195 in eight short years. The declining state of Venezuela’s economy 
caused government criticism for investing millions of dollars into space technology when 
other domestic needs were more critical.196 However, government officials successfully 
argued that space technology investments contribute directly to the development and well-
being of the country. 
Political factors cannot be dismissed as a contributor to the close relationship 
between Venezuela and China. Hugo Chávez himself said that an increasingly strong China 
is needed to transfer technology to the world, and that he is grateful for China’s non-
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imperialistic cooperation methods.197 In 2016, ABAE’s executive director wrote that “it is 
not a coincidence that the strengthening of relations with China came under the government 
of President Hugo Chavez.”198 Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution enabled strong Chinese 
space cooperation resulting in space technology that advanced Chavez’s politics 
throughout the country and region. 
Venezuela’s political instability and humanitarian crisis caused by Maduro have 
not deteriorated Chinese relations. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said in 2020 
that China would continue cooperation with Venezuela, despite U.S. sanctions threats.199 
While China may continue cooperation, it is important to highlight that Venezuela has been 
unable to repay $60 billion in Chinese loans,200 and severing cooperation may be 
financially impossible for China. ABAE’s Director of International Affairs hopes to 
acquire a replacement for the Simón Bolívar satellite in 2022,201 and it is assumed that 
another agreement will be signed with China. Thanks to the ongoing Sino-Venezuelan 
space cooperation, Venezuela expanded its space participation to the international realm. 
Since 2006, Venezuela has signed instruments of bilateral cooperation in the space 
field with five LAC countries, focusing on scientific and technological training.202 
Additionally, Venezuela was the third LAC country to join an international charter 
dedicated to delivering space data to those affected by major disasters. Within the United 
Nations, Venezuela’s representative welcomed the PPWT proposed by Russia and China 
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and considered it a legal instrument to protect peace in outer space.203 The delegate 
continued to express “concern about the development of spy satellites, by some member 
states of the UN, which constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of States.” One 
implication of that statement is that Venezuela aligns with China’s rhetoric that the United 
States poses a security concern in the space domain. 
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III. CASE STUDIES: MAJOR-DEVELOPED SPACE NATIONS 
This chapter introduces the case studies of Argentina and Brazil. These countries 
were selected and grouped because they each have a national space agency, a history of 
Chinese space cooperation, and “major-developed” space capabilities. These countries 
have participated in space activities as far back as the 1950s when Argentina researched 
and developed rocket engines204 and Brazil built a satellite reception station.205 This 
chapter is important because Argentina and Brazil prioritize advancing their national space 
industries and the need for sovereign space capabilities. Unlike the less-developed space 
nations, both countries seek mutual-benefit space cooperation and do not favor agreements 
leading to technological dependency. Therefore, Chinese space cooperation with Argentina 
and Brazil is uniquely different, yet shaped to promote long-term space partnerships. 
Argentine and Brazilian politics influenced space cooperation partners throughout 
the development of their space programs. Initially, both countries were aligned with the 
United States over their common opposition to communism in Latin America during the 
Cold War.206 However, as missile and nuclear proliferation emerged as facets of their 
bilateral regional competition, the United States placed export control restrictions on these 
regimes and limited the potential for space cooperation programs.  This drove “Latin 
American space programs to seek other partners, including nations hostile to U.S. 
interests.”207  
Argentina and Brazil have a history of space cooperation with the United States, 
among other international actors, but a preferred space partner is not yet apparent. Both 
countries are currently involved in Chinese space cooperation agreements, such as a 
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Chinese space station for Argentina and the China-Brazil joint satellite program for Brazil, 
engagements that are designed to be decades-long. Through bilateral and multilateral space 
cooperation, China has been allowed unprecedented access to space capabilities in the 
western hemisphere. 
A. ARGENTINA 
Argentina’s geographical territory accounts for most of the continent’s Southern 
Cone region and shares a border with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. One-
third of its 45.9 million inhabitants live in the capital city of Buenos Aires, while the 
remainder is primarily distributed among population masses in the northern and central 
regions.208 Once one of the wealthiest countries in the world, “Argentina suffered during 
most of the 20th century from recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current 
account deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt, and capital flight.”209 Despite the 
constant financial turmoil and political instability, Argentina transformed itself into one of 
the LAC region's most advanced and technologically independent space nations. 
Argentina presently faces another economic crisis that negatively impacts its space 
sector. Although Argentina has one of the largest economies in the region with abundant 
natural resources in energy, minerals, and agriculture,210 its current inflation rate is forty 
percent, and close to thirty percent of the population is unemployed.211 The government’s 
crushing $324 billion debt caused two loan defaults in the last 20 years,212 and it is avoiding 
its third default by negotiating with the International Monetary Fund on a $45 billion 
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debt.213 In 2016, government investments in national satellite manufacture, launch, and 
operation fell by fifty-five percent.214 The economic strain caused a 2019 ESA space launch 
contract breach for an Argentine telecommunications satellite that was never developed.215 
Argentina faces a situation where it must abandon progress in its space sector or seek new 
international space cooperation or investment opportunities to advance its national space 
plan objectives.   
1. Space Activities Overview 
Argentina’s National Commission for Space Research (Comisión Nacional de 
Investigaciones Espaciales [CNIE]) was founded in 1960 and marked the nation’s entry 
into the space domain.216 CNIE immediately collaborated with the Argentine Air Force to 
produce and launch the region’s first domestic rocket into space.217 Early engagements 
with U.S. space officials resulted in a NASA-CNIE MoU, leading to many of Argentina’s 
successful 1960s rocket launches.218 CNIE inherited political ideologies that promoted 
nationalism through militarism and domestic technology development,219 yet Argentina’s 
space program developed in close collaboration with U.S. partnership. 
In the mid-1970s, Argentina’s space activities were affected by political turmoil 
that resulted in a military coup. Scientific rocket research was halted, and a military missile 
program named Condor, in collaboration with a West German company, took priority.220 
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Tensions with Chile plus Argentina’s 1982 defeat in the Falklands War promoted 
cooperation with Egypt and Iraq to develop a more advanced Condor II ballistic missile. 
Political and financial factors, including U.S. pressure, terminated the program in the 
1980s.221 The United States also obstructed the Argentine military’s pursuit of nuclear 
technology when it withdrew its support and prevented external assistance to the 
program.222 Later, Argentina reallocated the accumulated experience and infrastructure 
towards national civil space efforts.  
Argentina’s shift from militarizing space to civilian purposes resulted in the 
establishment of its national space agency. In 1991, the Argentine president issued a decree 
that dissolved CNIE and created the National Commission of Space Activities (Comisión 
Nacional de Actividades Espaciales [CONAE]).223 CONAE released its first national space 
plan in 1995 that focused on three components: Earth observation, peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space, and technological developments for space use.224 Space activity 
was declared state policy to generate a high impact and benefit for social, environmental, 
economic, scientific, technological, and academic development.225 
Unlike the less-developed space nations, Argentina’s mature space sector focused 
on advancing national capabilities beyond social development needs. Policy dictated 
CONAE to pursue international cooperation of an associative character, a model that 
moved away from countries helping each other and shifted to building partnerships for 
mutual development.226 For example, CONAE participated in the deep space networks of 
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the ESA and the CLTC227 and partnered with NASA on the scientific Aquarius mission to 
study the Earth’s surface and oceans.228 These cooperation agreements inserted the country 
among nations and organizations dedicated to space research and exploration. Argentina’s 
regionally advanced space program is thus highly cooperative and open to space 
cooperation with countries like China that share policies of South-South mutual 
development. 
a. Launch Capabilities 
Argentina’s desire to reach space was the main driver for its earliest space efforts. 
Initial rocket research success led to a tactical ballistic missile development program during 
Argentina’s military rule. CONAE’s establishment consolidated the nation’s launch 
capabilities and repurposed the efforts for civil use. Indigenous space launch capability to 
place national satellites in orbit is now one of CONAE’s fundamental goals.229  
Currently, CONAE’s space launch vehicle program remains in the research and 
development phase. The Tronador series of launch vehicles have been under development 
since 2007 and should have the capacity to put a 250-kilogram and a 1,000-kilogram 
satellite into polar orbit.230 CONAE conducted Tronador experimental tests and launches 
at two Argentinean space launch centers, the Punta Indio Space Center231 and the Manuel 
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Belgrano Space Center, located within Argentina’s Puerto Belgrano Naval Base.232 
Consequently, third-party international organizations have performed all space launches 
for Argentina’s satellites. 
b. Satellite Production 
Argentina relied on a state-owned enterprise to fulfill its national satellite 
development. In 1979, INVAP was founded to address national technological needs by 
transferring academic knowledge to the industrial sector.233 The company initially 
developed state nuclear technology and later became the contractor for the nation’s space 
program. INVAP is the only LAC company capable of providing complete satellite 
programs and has produced seven satellites for CONAE since 1996.234 In addition, the 
state-run Argentine Satellite Solutions Company (Empresa Argentina de Soluciones 
Satelitales [ARSAT]) contracted with INVAP to develop national telecommunications 
satellites.235 INVAP has partnered with international agencies such as NASA, ESA, the 
Center for Space Studies in France (Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales [CNES]), the 
Brazilian Space Agency (Agência Espacial Brasileira [AEB]),236 and Turkish 
Aerospace.237 Much like CONAE’s foreign policy, INVAP built international associations 
for the common development of satellite production. 
c. Satellite Operations 
As one of the region’s major-developed space nations, Argentina develops, owns, 
and operates SATCOM, EO, and scientific satellites. Argentina achieved sovereign 
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satellite capabilities via national and private organizations and through international 
cooperation. Argentina’s National Space Plan prioritized the creation of higher education 
and job opportunities in the space sector.238 CONAE and the National University of 
Córdoba offer a master's degree in space applications and a doctorate in geomatics and 
space systems.239 Additionally, CONAE and the Colomb Institute offer three master’s 
degrees in radio astronomy research. Argentina’s investment in human capital and capacity 
building has contributed to the success of native satellite production and operations. 
Between 1996–2011, CONAE carried out four scientific satellite missions with 
cooperation and contributions from NASA, the Italian Space Agency, CNES, the Danish 
Space Research Institute, and the Canadian Space Agency.240 This series of Scientific 
Applications Satellites (Satélite de Aplicaciones Científicas [SAC]) demonstrated 
technology, tested space instruments, and took scientific Earth observations and 
environmental measurements. CONAE personnel operated the SAC satellites via the 
Córdoba Earth Station located in the country’s Teófilo Tabanera Space Center. INVAP 
was the prime contractor for developing the satellites, and NASA provided the space 
launch service.241  
Argentina achieved its domestic SATCOM capabilities through a state-owned 
company. In 2006, federal law created ARSAT for the domestic development of GEO 
SATCOM satellites, the provision of satellites facilities, and the commercialization of 
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satellite services.242 INVAP was the primary developer for the ARSAT-series satellites and 
performed all satellite testing and continued operations.243 ESA space vehicles launched 
ARSAT-1 in 2014 and ARSAT-2 in 2015, and the constellation offered coverage for the 
entire western hemisphere, including Antarctica and the Falkland Islands.244 
CONAE’s latest satellite program provided the nation with EO capabilities. The 
Argentine Microwave Observation Satellite (Satélite Argentino de Observación Con 
Microondas [SAOCOM]) program’s primary objective was to deliver socio-economic 
benefits in the agriculture, hydrology, and health sectors.245 The satellite’s indigenous 
synthetic aperture radar provides soil moisture maps that support regional decisions related 
to sowing, fertilization, irrigation, fumigation, and flood forecasting.246 INVAP built two 
identical SAOCOM satellites, and they were launched in 2018 and 2020 by U.S.-based 
SpaceX. A bilateral agreement between CONAE and the Italian Space Agency allowed 
both agencies to share EO data between satellites for the purpose of emergency and disaster 
management.247 
2. Sino-Argentine Space Cooperation 
Argentina and China announced the signing of a bilateral space cooperation 
agreement in 2004. This partnership allowed China to provide Argentina with commercial 
launch services, satellite components, and other space-related technology.248 In 2005, 
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representatives from Argentina traveled to China to observe the inauguration of the 
multilateral space cooperation organization named APSCO, however, Argentina never 
joined. That same year, Argentina’s University of San Juan collaborated with China 
National Astronomical Observatories and the China National Academy of Science to 
develop a satellite laser ranging facility.249 Despite these mid-2000s space cooperation 
efforts, the most significant Chinese partnership outcomes occurred in the following 
decade. 
Sino-Argentine space cooperation resulted in the construction of a Chinese-
operated satellite launch and tracking facility in Argentina. The CLTC-CONAE-
NEUQUEN Station was the product of interinstitutional agreements between the CLTC, 
CONAE, the province of Neuquén, and a 2014 intergovernmental agreement between the 
Argentine Republic and the PRC.250 China invested $300 million to construct a 35-meter 
primary antenna, a 13.5-meter antenna, an operations center, and an educational center.251 
CONAE stated the facility was leased tax-free to China for 50 years and is for the 
communication, command, and data acquisition of Chinese Lunar Exploration Program 
(CLEP) missions, and for the observation and exploration of deep space and radio 
astronomy.252 As China’s first satellite control station outside its borders, this agreement 
allows China to communicate with its satellites and space mission vehicles when they are 
in view from the western hemisphere. 
China first utilized the CLTC-CONAE-NEUQUEN Station in 2018 during a 
historic Moon mission. On December 7, China launched the Chang’e 4 mission to land a 
rover on the far side of the Moon. In conjunction with Chinese stations in China and 
Namibia, the Argentine station tracked and communicated with the Chang’e 4 spacecraft 
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and Chinese relay satellites.253 These ground stations were later utilized in the success of 
the Chang’e 5 mission that retrieved samples from the Moon254 and the Tianwen-1 mission, 
which landed a Chinese rover on the surface of Mars.255 
Argentina dimly benefited from the construction of the Chinese station in various 
ways. The cooperation agreement granted CONAE access to 10 percent of the antenna’s 
use time to develop national scientific research projects and regional and international 
cooperation.256 In addition, CONAE may install onsite equipment and utilize the network 
of space ground stations in Chinese territory to support Argentine space missions. CONAE 
stated that the facility promoted the community's economic, technological, and educational 
development by creating jobs and promoting tourism to its education center.257 
In 2020, China and Argentina resumed and expanded on the space cooperation 
agreements established in 2014. The deal focused on the “development of ships and other 
instruments for space exploration, as well as land infrastructure to launch and control space 
missions and satellites.”258 The agreement also increased space data sharing, research, and 
academic findings between CONAE and CNSA. The establishment of long-term space 
cooperation and the creation of the CLTC-CONAE-NEUQUEN Station have tied both 
countries into a 50-year agreement of joint efforts toward advancing their space 
capabilities. 
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3. Analysis 
In 2011, Delgado-Lopez noted that China had not played an important role in 
Argentina’s space program but that China was sure to remain an important player in 
Argentina’s economic and political future.259 Argentina faced a financial crisis in the late 
1990s through the early 2000s, and U.S.-Argentine relations declined; the governing 
Kirchner political party and the Argentine population blamed U.S. policies as one reason 
for the economic meltdown.260 The United States failed to offer any financial assistance, 
and, as a result, Argentina increased bilateral relations with China.261 The recent space 
cooperation agreements with China, including the Chinese-operated ground station, were 
due to Kirchner’s return to political office. 
In 2015, then Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced the 
prospect of “military sales and defense cooperation agreements extending beyond the scope 
of any made between China and a Latin American nation to date.”262 Under space 
cooperation, Argentina endorsed the Chinese construction of the CLTC-CONAE-
NEUQUEN Station. CONAE stated the installation’s CLEP mission and the Chinese body 
in charge, the CLTC, are purely civil.263 However, a China Aerospace Studies Institute 
report emphasized that “there are strong indications that [the CLTC] is a major 
component—or potentially synonymous with—the PLA [Strategic Support Force] SSF 
Space Systems Department.”264 The bilateral agreement allowed China to utilize the 
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facility tax-free for 50 years to communicate with current and future satellites and space 
missions visible over the western hemisphere, with the potential for unregulated military 
use.  
Argentina faces another financial crisis, and China may provide relief for its debt 
and its underfunded space program. In November 2020, Argentina’s ambassador to China 
confirmed that Argentina “is making plans to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) very 
soon.”265 The BRI would provide Argentina with much-needed opportunities for 
cooperation in infrastructure projects, financial assistance, and access to Space Silk Road 
programs. China is Argentina’s largest trading partner and considers Argentina a 
comprehensive strategic partner, a status few countries have,266 in a period where the 
United States seeks to rebuilt relations. 
B. BRAZIL 
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the largest and most populated country in the 
LAC region. Its area covers nearly half of the continent and borders every South American 
nation except Chile and Ecuador.267 A military dictatorship governed Brazil from 1964–
1985. During this period, the military prioritized the development of missiles and a nuclear 
program.268 The country returned to democracy in 1988, and its space program was 
converted to a civilian agency. The military’s focus on space capabilities helped advance 
the country’s development of satellites, launch vehicles, and launch centers.269  
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Between 2003–2014, Brazil underwent an economic and social progress boom 
where more than 10 percent of the population left poverty.270 Economic advances and 
geopolitical efforts by Russia and China to supplant the G-7 allowed Brazil to join the 
BRICS global grouping of emerging economies. According to 2020 World Bank nominal 
GDP data, Brazil ranks first among the largest economies in the LAC region and twelfth 
in the world.271 It is unquestionably a regional power and “sometimes considered a great 
or a middle power in international affairs.”272 However, since 2015, crippling recessions, 
unemployment, and national debt have halted much of Brazil’s economic progress from 
the previous decade.273 Despite economic and technological setbacks, Brazil continues to 
have the most capable and diverse space program in the LAC region. 
1. Space Activities Overview 
Brazil’s space efforts can be described as a “complex web of civilian and military 
institutions that have evolved since the late 1950s.”274 Following the post-war efforts of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, Brazil sought to develop its own ballistic missile 
and nuclear technologies during its authoritarian military rule.275 Brazil’s space 
development was seen “as a natural extension of the country’s long-running strategy to 
establish itself, at a minimum, as Latin America’s hegemon, with respect not only to South 
America but to the entire South Atlantic Ocean region.”276 Like Argentina, Brazil’s space 
advancements during military rule created the momentum to develop into a regional space 
power. 
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Brazil created the Brazilian Space Agency (Agência Espacial Brasileira [AEB]) in 
1994. Brazil’s national space plan, the National Space Activities Program (Programa 
Nacional de Atividades Espaciais [PNAE]), was based on three strategic focuses. PNAE 
emphasized the development of space applications to respond to national problems and 
societal needs, the sovereignty of space capabilities, and the development and 
competitiveness of its space industry.277 The desire for technological independence led 
Brazil to partner with multiple countries in an effort to achieve autonomy in the satellite 
and launch sectors. Brazil historically saw international space cooperation as a necessity 
for the future of its space program and a means to answer national needs.278 Additionally, 
cooperation was seen as a method for joint development and not seeking technical 
assistance or dependency. As a result of shared values, the first Sino-Brazilian space 
cooperation program began in the 1980s and the agreement continues to this day.  
a. Launch Capabilities 
The military’s prioritization of a missile program led to Brazil closely following 
Argentina’s initial progress in rocket technology. In 1965, the nation’s aerospace technical 
center established Brazil’s first launch facility: the Barreira do Inferno Launch Center 
(Centro de Lançamento da Barreira do Inferno [CLBI]).279 That same year, CLBI launched 
the nation’s first indigenous rocket. Over the next 12 years, CLBI hosted over 200 national 
and international sounding rocket launches, tests, and experiments.280 In total, Brazil 
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launched 28 sounding rockets.281 The technical knowledge and experience gained from the 
sounding rocket program were the basis for Brazil attempting a space launch program. 
In 1979, the federal government approved the Brazilian Complete Space Mission 
(Missão Espacial Completa Brasileira [MECB]) to prioritize the development of 
indigenous satellites, space launch vehicles, and space launch centers.282 A larger space 
launch center was required and the Alcantara Launch Center (Centro de Lançamento de 
Alcântara [CLA]) was inaugurated in 1983. National agencies were charged with executing 
the MECB, and the VLS-1 space launch vehicle program began.  
Brazil’s 1995 decision to join the Missile Technology Control Regime opened 
doors to space cooperation, such as an International Space Station agreement that led to 
the first Brazilian astronaut to go into space.283 But, it also prevented the acquisition of 
missile technologies, forcing ABE to develop indigenous solutions for the VLS-1 
program.284 ABE developed the rocket prototype in 1997, but a mechanical malfunction 
destroyed it during liftoff.285 The second prototype suffered a similar fate in 1999. In 2003, 
the third prototype ended in disaster when it exploded on the CLA launch pad, killing 21 
personnel.286 Reports indicated that an insufficient budget, obsolete parts, and questionable 
procedures may have contributed to the incident.287  
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Since the disaster, Brazil leveraged its geographically favorable launch centers to 
try to foster international space cooperation. Brazil entered into checkered agreements with 
Ukraine, Russia, and Germany with hopes to generate revenue for its space program and 
receive technical information and assistance, diverting from MECB’s focus on 
technological independence.288 In 2021, AEB announced the selection of three American 
and one Canadian commercial companies to utilize CLA facilities to launch non-
governmental space vehicles.289 These agreements may be Brazil’s necessary first steps to 
be financially and technologically prepared to resume its indigenous launch capabilities. 
b. Satellite Production 
Brazil's first national satellite was operational in 1993, and it was the first country 
in the region to achieve this feat. Brazil’s National Institute of Space Research (Instituto 
Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [INPE]) developed the Data Collection Satellite (Satélite 
de Coleta de Dados [SCD]).290 SCD-1 performed environmental monitoring and provided 
a radio link to data receiving stations throughout Brazil. In 1997, ABE attempted to launch 
a second SCD-2A satellite with its indigenous launch vehicle; however, it was destroyed 
onboard the first VLS-1 mishap. INPE constructed a third SCD-2 satellite in 1998, and like 
SCD-1, SCD-2 was successfully launched on a Pegasus rocket by the late American 
company Orbital Sciences.291 Additionally, INPE developed a SACI series of scientific 
satellites in the late 90s.292 However, neither satellite became operational due to launch or 
operational failures. 
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INPE recently developed Brazil’s next generation of EO satellites. Amazonia 1 was 
based on a cost-cutting multi-mission platform and was indigenously designed, integrated, 
and tested in Brazil.293 It was launched in February 2021 onboard an Indian space launch 
vehicle. Various national companies were awarded contracts to manufacture the satellite’s 
different subsystems and equipment.294 Amazonia 1’s development led to valuable 
technological gains and national industry consolidation of satellite subsystem knowledge.  
c. Satellite Operations 
Brazil is a regional major-developed space nation that operates national SATCOM, 
EO, and scientific satellites. INPE is the agency responsible for satellite and ground center 
operations. Its satellite tracking and control capabilities are achieved through a satellite 
control center and two tracking and control stations.295 The three series of satellites that 
INPE currently manages are SCD, CBERS, and Amazonia.  
As part of the MECB, Brazil built data collection satellites to initiate and develop 
its indigenous satellite program. The SCD series of satellites served environmental and 
scientific missions. The payload is a communications transponder that receives 
meteorological and ecological information from automatic data collection platforms 
throughout Brazil; the satellite then relays the data to INPE Earth stations.296 The data is 
used in the monitoring of river basins and for the country’s Amazon surveillance system.297 
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In February 2021, SCD-1, designed with a 1-year lifespan, celebrated 28 years of 
operations.298  
Brazil’s second national satellite capability was achieved through a joint program 
with China. The CBERS-series of EO satellites gave Brazil the ability to monitor its vast 
territory. Since 1999, China has launched six CBERS satellites; CBERS-3 was lost during 
a launch failure, three have been decommissioned, but two remain operational.299 The most 
recent satellite was launched in 2019. The images captured by the CBERS satellites are 
used in various sectors to control deforestation, monitor water resources and agriculture, 
optimize city planning, facilitate education, and more.300 Brazil and China alternate 
command and control of the CBERS satellites every 10 months.301 However, each country 
operates the EO payload whenever a satellite passes over its territory.  
Amazonia 1 is Brazil’s indigenous EO satellite under national control. Its mission 
improves the Amazon deforestation alert system, and its sensor complements the 
capabilities of the current generation of CBERS.302 Additionally, the data is available to 
government agencies and the scientific community to monitor coastal regions, water 
reservoirs, and environmental disasters.303 
Brazil’s national communications satellite was designed for dual civil-military use. 
The ministry of defense, the ministry of science, technology, and innovation, AEB, INPE, 
and the telecommunications company Telebras formed the agreement for the Geostationary 
 
298 “SCD-l completa 28 anos em operação” [SCD-1 completes 28 years of operations], Instituto 
Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [National Institute for Space Research], August 20, 2021, 
https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-noticias/satelite-de-coleta-de-dados-1-scd-l-completa-28-
anos-em-operacao. 
299 Agência Espacial Brasileira [Brazilian Space Agency], “Objetos espaciais Brasileiros” [Brazilian 
space objects].  
300 “CBERS História,” Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [National Institute for Space 
Research], February 5, 2018, http://www.cbers.inpe.br/sobre/index.php. 
301 “Preguntas Frequentes” [Common Questions], Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [National 
Institute for Space Research], accessed September 2, 2021, http://www.inpe.br/faq/index.php?pai=17. 
302 Agência Espacial Brasileira [Brazilian Space Agency], “Satélites.” 
303 “Amazon Mission.” 
67 
Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite (Satélite Geoestacionário de Defesa e 
Comunicações Estratégicas [SGDC]) program.304 The French company Thales Alenia 
Space manufactured the GEO defense and strategic communications satellite and was 
launched in May 2017 by an ESA Ariane V rocket from French Guiana.305 SGDC was 
designed to provide civil high-speed internet and communications for the entire country, 
reaching all remote regions and increasing service to schools and hospitals. Brazil’s armed 
forces operate the satellite from a military space operations center,306 and they are allotted 
thirty percent of the satellite’s capacity for secure satellite communications.307 An MoU 
between AEB and Thales Alenia Space permitted the training of 30 Brazilian engineers 
and allowed technology transfer contracts.308 The Brazilian government plans to procure a 
second SGDC satellite and hopes to incorporate Brazilian components to increase local 
industry capacity.309 
2. Sino-Brazilian Space Cooperation 
AEB traces the history of Sino-Brazilian space cooperation back to 1988. In that 
year, the governments of Brazil and China signed a bilateral agreement for the joint 
research and production of the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites.310 The MECB 
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motivated Brazil’s participation because it encouraged remote sensing capabilities.311 
PNAE classified the partnership as strategic to promote technology transfer and develop 
the ability to monitor Chinese and Brazilian territory and its natural resources.312 The 
agencies responsible for executing the program were INPE and the China Academy of 
Space Technology (CAST). 
Agreements for early CBERS satellites had China as the prime contributor. Until 
2007, China provided seventy percent of the financial and technological investment for the 
first three CBERS satellites.313 Afterward, Brazil planned to contribute half of the 
investment for the remaining three satellites, aligning with the concept of mutual 
development. When the fourth CBERS satellite was destroyed in 2013 due to a Chinese 
launch problem, Brazil’s half of the $250 million satellite project was lost.314 This failure 
implies that China may have subsidized some of Brazil’s future CBERS investment 
contributions. Despite the setbacks, Sino-Brazilian space cooperation remains a mutual 
development program that meets “strategic objectives of the Brazilian Space Program, 
notably regarding the expansion and consolidation of the space industry.”315 The CBERS 
satellite capabilities have made Brazil the world’s largest provider of free satellite 
images.316 
In 2015, China proposed the multilateral establishment of a BRICS constellation of 
EO satellites. The network of remote sensing satellites and infrastructure were to be 
established by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to “deal with global 
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challenges such as climate change, major disasters, and environmental deterioration.”317 
The agreement was recently signed in August 2021 and became the first space 
infrastructure project by BRICS countries. CBERS joined Chinese, Russian, and Indian 
satellites to form the constellation.318 Additionally, Brazil’s satellite control center was 
selected as a global data receiving node for the constellation, elevating Brazil’s global 
space capabilities provider status. In turn, China gained western hemisphere capabilities 
and international recognition for leading BRICS countries in space cooperation.  
3. Analysis 
Brazil’s early focus on international space cooperation led to a long, ongoing 
bilateral partnership with China. The CBERS satellite program allowed the two developing 
space countries to meet domestic goals of improving socioeconomic conditions, advancing 
space technologies, and achieving sovereign space capabilities. CBERS' success led to the 
agreement of a 2002 protocol that provided a more robust framework for future Sino-
Brazilian space cooperation.319 The protocol was lauded as a good example of South-South 
cooperation among developing countries. Although China initially offered most CBERS 
investment, Brazil has since provided nearly half of the funding for the current generation 
of satellites. Even so, CBERS satellites remain manufactured and launched in China.    
As part of the BRICS economic bloc, Brazil gained distinction in multinational 
space cooperation. Brazil appears to use its space capabilities to exert global power 
projection to “establish itself as a regional hegemon and… to raise its prestige and standing 
internationally.”320 In 2015, Brazil signed an MoU on cooperation in science, technology, 
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and innovation between the BRICS governments to strengthen space cooperation.321 The 
agreement led to a Chinese-proposed initiative that, in 2021, created a virtual constellation 
of EO satellites owned, operated, and shared among BRICS nations. Brazil contributed to 
this initiative through CBERS and its satellite control center. However, the constellation 
did not include Brazil’s newest Amazonia 1 EO satellite. 
Recent political shifts in Brazil’s government may contribute to a weakening in 
Sino-Brazilian space cooperation. Under ex-President Lula da Silva, Brazil's left-leaning 
politics favored Chinese cooperation as an alternative to the traditional great powers.322 
Over the last decade, bilateral relations expanded in many fields of cooperation, and the 
two countries grew closer than ever. The strategic partnership between Brazil and China 
caused bilateral trade to reach a historic high, mutual investment to grow in different 
economic sectors, and initiatives to expand in space exploration.323  
In 2019, a far-right politician named Jair Bolsonaro became president of Brazil. 
Bolsonaro’s frequent critiques of China “marked [a] departure from the historical trend in 
Brazil-China relations, which has trended toward deeper economic and political 
relations.”324 Favorable U.S. sentiments within Brazil’s new government led to renewed 
space cooperation by signing a technology safeguard agreement (TSA). The TSA allowed 
U.S. companies to conduct space launches from CLA while protecting sensitive space 
technology, challenging the future of Sino-Brazilian space launch cooperation.325  
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Likewise, Brazil strengthened its space cooperation with India by selecting an 
Indian space launch vehicle for its Amazonia 1 mission. This agreement was a milestone 
for the Indian-Brazilian strategic partnership because it marked the first time Brazil chose 
an Indian space launch vehicle over a Chinese one.326 Furthermore, the two countries 
signed 15 new agreements, which included enhanced space cooperation. As a result, India 
could use Brazilian satellite control and tracking stations to track and receive data from 
Indian satellites and collaborate on future Indian lunar robotic and manned space 
missions.327 These actions could be agreements among the BRICS nations or a shift away 
from future Sino-Brazilian space partnerships. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to analyze Sino-LAC space cooperation with those countries that 
have prioritized space development enough to have a national space program. The reason 
for this analysis was to answer the following questions: what are the motivations behind 
Sino-LAC space cooperation, and what do the parties stand to gain? How is Sino-LAC 
space cooperation structured, and is China promoting long-term technological 
dependencies with LAC countries? What challenges does this pose to U.S. space security, 
and is U.S. space policy effectively responding to the reality of regional Chinese 
proliferation within the space domain? 
China's LAC and space activities policy papers aspire to unify and strengthen the 
PRC to become a global model for other developing countries. Ultimately, LAC countries 
seek Chinese space cooperation for two primary reasons: the need to acquire Chinese-built 
space capabilities to benefit national socioeconomic development or for mutual 
technological development to achieve sovereign space autonomy. This thesis argues that 
in relation to the less-developed space nations, China uses space cooperation as one tool to 
control developing economies and as a method to exert its geopolitical influence within the 
western hemisphere. In relation to the major-developed space nations, China uses space 
cooperation to advance its space capabilities in the western hemisphere. In both cases, 
China mostly designs Sino-LAC space cooperation to foster long-term space engagements 
and potential dependencies while promoting China’s international space projection goals. 
Furthermore, this thesis concludes that a threat to U.S. space security due to Sino-LAC 
space cooperation is feasible, and that U.S. space policy is not appropriately implemented 
to predict, detect, and deter such a concern. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
To answer the major research questions asked in Chapter I, two sets of case studies 
were formed. Chapter II examined the case studies of Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela to 
understand the dynamics of Sino-LAC space cooperation with regionally developing space 
nations. Chinese space cooperation with all three countries originated between 2005-2010, 
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a period in which China emerged as a major global provider of satellite products, 
applications, and space launch services. All three countries sought space cooperation to 
satisfy national development goals and to advance technological competency. Political or 
economic alignments and national prestige were also noteworthy motivators for Bolivia, 
Peru, and Venezuela to select China as a space cooperation partner. 
Bolivia and Venezuela acquired their first space capabilities through bilateral 
agreements to purchase turn-key Chinese satellite solutions. Bolivia’s acquisition of a 
Chinese-built communications satellite saw immediate cost-cutting benefits while 
satisfying constitutional obligations, meeting national socioeconomic development goals, 
and promoting the government’s socialist agenda. Venezuela was China’s first LAC 
customer to purchase satellite solutions. Chinese SATCOM and EO satellite programs 
were designed to enhance Venezuela’s capacity building, personnel training, and 
technology transfer. Space capabilities and their applications were also used to advance the 
socialist politics of Hugo Chavez and Nicholas Maduro.  
Bolivia is expected to acquire its second Chinese communications satellite by 
2022.328 It is also predicted that China will develop Venezuela’s second communications 
satellite to replace the failed VENESAT-1. All satellite development contracts bolstered 
China’s commercial and national space sectors. Chinese organizations like GWIC, CASC, 
and CAST advanced their satellite development capabilities while increasing their 
international customer portfolios. China’s national space agency signed agreements with 
LAC space agencies to share capabilities and data. Risky financing through Chinese 
national banks highly subsidized these space programs, creating opportunities for indebted 
control over regional economies.  
Peru requested a remote-sensing satellite proposal, yet China withheld from the 
bidding process. Instead, Sino-Peruvian space cooperation is based on a Chinese-led 
multilateral organization, where China provides most of the investment and dependency. 
Peru gains from APSCO membership by having access to six cooperative programs, two 
of which resulted in constructing Chinese space infrastructure in Peru. China gained by 
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using APSCO’s global infrastructure to increase its space capabilities and by leading 
APSCO in international forums to advance its space agenda. Furthermore, all space 
cooperation is integrated into China’s BRI framework, allowing a seamless correlation 
with Chinese trade, finance, and infrastructure programs for Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela.  
Chapter III examined the case studies of Argentina and Brazil to understand the 
dynamics of Sino-LAC space cooperation with regionally advanced space nations. Both 
nations began their space efforts in the 1950s and now possess developed space-based 
capabilities, indigenous development capacities, and space launcher programs. China and 
Brazil initiated bilateral space cooperation in the 1980s, and the resultant CBERS satellite 
program is a successful example of enduring South-South space cooperation. As 
developing nations of the time, the CBERS framework was designed for mutual benefit. 
Yet, China ultimately controls manufacturing, launch, and most of the financing. In 
addition, Brazil’s multilateral inclusion in the BRICS grouping allows for Chinese-
influenced space cooperation. The resultant BRICS virtual EO constellation allows China 
increased access to EO imagery. Brazil’s satellite control center, selected as a constellation 
downlink node, may download Chinese satellite imagery from the western hemisphere. 
By contrast, China did not play a significant role in Argentina’s developing space 
program. However, Argentina’s financial crisis and anti-U.S. political factors of the late 
1990s through early 2000s played an influential role in evolving Sino-Argentine space 
cooperation. Sino-Argentine space cooperation began in the 2000s. A decade later, a 50-
year tax-free bilateral space cooperation agreement permitted China to build and operate a 
space tracking and control facility in Argentina. The station’s space object tracking and 
control functions allowed China to successfully communicate with Chinese satellites and 
a space mission vehicle to land a rover on the far side of the Moon. More significantly, it 
is China’s first military-operated space station outside of its borders. Both Argentina and 
China state the station’s peaceful uses of outer space, yet concern regarding China’s ability 
to utilize the station for military applications has made headlines in recent years. Recurring 
Argentine financial crises and reemerging shared political interests have reinvigorated 
Sino-Argentine cooperation. Argentina stated it plans to join the BRI, and new Sino-
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Argentine agreements will increase space data sharing and allow for the new construction 
of Chinese space infrastructure in Argentina.  
B. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Chinese space cooperation is an intricate network of bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks tied to geopolitical, economic, and military policies. Defining Chinese space 
cooperation and its strategic motivations requires understanding the driving politics and 
doctrines behind them. One such policy driver uncovered in the research is China’s BRI. 
In 2016, China published a white paper on its space activities and called for creating the 
BRI Space Information Corridor (also referred to as the Space Silk Road) to distinguish 
space-related development projects from the broader BRI framework. This association 
implies that China uses space cooperation as one tool to control developing economies.  
A BRI MoU has been signed with 19 out of 33 LAC countries, including Bolivia, 
Peru, and Venezuela. A Foreign Policy article stated that China's continuous lending 
through the BRI created a trend in which indebted nations put up strategic assets as 
collateral via these predatory deals.329 The article also mentioned an International 
Monetary Fund study from 2013 to 2016 that showed China nearly doubled its contribution 
to the foreign debt of heavily indebted developing nations. Furthermore, It continued by 
citing that "observers suspect that the [BRI] is partly motivated by China's desire to 
stimulate its economy, obtain strategic assets, and convert its economic access into political 
and strategic influence in recipient nations."330 In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper 
said the PRC is using the BRI to leverage “its overseas investments to force other nations 
into sub-optimal security decisions. This has wide-reaching ramifications for the United 
 




States and our allies in critical areas like data security, interoperability, and military 
readiness.”331 
Published data showed that between 2005 and 2020, China has amassed roughly 
$183 billion in LAC investments and contracts across many sectors.332 Consequently, 
China is now the top trading partner and a preferred lender across the region,333 signaling 
a trend of diminishing U.S. economic influence.  
However, the PRC cannot ignore that the four largest economies in the region, 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, have not joined the BRI,334 although Argentina 
recently declared it would soon join. Five years have passed since the PRC updated its 
policy papers on the LAC region and its space activities, and it may revise the conditions 
in an attempt to incorporate the region's most influential economic and spacefaring nations 
into the BRI. Doing so could increase the PRC’s global infrastructure project's legitimacy 
while strengthening Chinese-LAC space cooperation. 
The future of Chinese-led multilateral space cooperation was published in APSCO's 
Development Vision 2030 document. APSCO, as a participating organization in the BRI, 
provides relevant space services within the BRI framework.335 The PRC acknowledged 
that the organization relies heavily on Chinese technological and financial support due to 
the limited space capabilities and modest economies of its seven non-Chinese APSCO 
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member states.336 APSCO's longevity may become problematic if the PRC cannot expand 
membership to more economically and technologically capable nations. 
APSCO is open to all UN members in the Asia-Pacific region; however, any UN 
member state outside the region may apply as an associate member and access cooperative 
activities.337 Expanding APSCO membership for LAC nations would create greater 
international recognition, economic and technological backing, and regional space 
influence for China. Because associate member terms are negotiable,338 China could 
propose favorable terms for advanced space countries to join. Indeed, Argentina and 
Mexico have already been invited to join, yet neither have become members.  
Since its inception, APSCO has launched 13 joint research projects, recruited 250 
master's and Ph.D. candidates, and trained over 1,000 technicians.339 China could extend 
these advanced training and educational opportunities to entice countries like Argentina 
and Brazil that seek sovereign space autonomy. In addition, the PRC could tailor shared 
access to space systems or data to developing LAC countries seeking space capabilities to 
meet domestic development or technological goals. For instance, Peru acquired a Chinese 
EO satellite used for disaster management and environmental protection, but it doesn’t 
have national SATCOM capabilities. Bolivia acquired a Chinese communications satellite 
to expand services to remote regions, but it doesn’t have national EO capabilities. The PRC 
and Chinese state-run technical companies could open more space technologies to the LAC 
region, including easier and cheaper access to launch services or technical assistance. In 
that case, China could better leverage space cooperation to deepen economic and 
technological ties with LAC nations. 
 
336 Nie. 
337 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization. 
338 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. 
339 Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, Development Vision 2030 of The Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). 
79 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
China’s strategic objective is to become a modern superpower, but its methods of 
achieving such a status, and end state, are opaque. Chinese President Xi Jinping aims to 
modernize its military and national defense by 2035 and transform the PLA into a world-
class military by 2049.340 While the PRC does not clearly define the meaning of “world-
class,” it is believed that China will emphasize military-civil fusion in developing space 
technologies to modernize its military and boost economic growth.341 Such investments 
are considered threats to U.S. space assets because China is advancing its dual-use 
counterspace technologies to deny adversarial access to space assets through kinetic and 
non-kinetic capabilities. This strategy presents a threat to national security because China’s 
pursuit of space superiority is described as a zero-sum game that “harms U.S. economic 
competitiveness, weakens U.S. military advantages, and undermines strategic stability.”342 
The 2016 Chinese LAC policy paper opened by addressing the PRC's agenda based 
on its short- and long-term modernization goals. China claimed its development could not 
occur without the co-development of emerging LAC countries.343 This version introduced 
space cooperation as a means of strengthening economic partnerships, removing prior 
military utility implications, despite the PLA's military-civil space integration.344 China 
recognized the beneficial domestic applications of space technologies in developing LAC 
countries and promoted mutual space cooperation in the region.345 Significant efforts 
included establishing bilateral and multilateral partnerships and forums that promoted 
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South-South cooperation for rapid development in trade, investment, finance, 
infrastructure, and various types of personnel exchanges. China utilized the LAC policy 
papers as a blueprint to introduce an intertwined mix of multilateral global infrastructure, 
economic development, and space cooperation projects to the region, such as APSCO, the 
BRI, and BRICS.  
The 2020 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission stressed that over the past 15 years, China had turned its focus toward 
surpassing the United States by promoting the ruling CCP’s system and values as an 
alternative to the United States.346 In 2019, the PRC released a national defense white paper 
where it described the space domain as a critical component in international strategic 
competition.347 Thus, the PRC may utilize LAC nations as geostrategic associates to 
undermine the United States and its alliance system. If successful, the PRC will expand its 
space capabilities into the western hemisphere, challenge U.S. space security and influence, 
and increase its impact on international forums to promote Chinese space interests. 
U.S. policies and reports on space security quickly highlight competitive technical 
challenges posed by countries such as China. Unclassified documents have surfaced that 
detail advanced Chinese space- and ground-based space capabilities, the threats posed to 
U.S. space systems, and the need for the United States to deter and defend against such 
threats. Yet, mostly absent from these reports are the implications of Chinese space 
cooperation and space infrastructure partnerships to national space security.  
The National Space Policy (NSP) of the United States of America says it must 
“adapt [U.S.] national security organizations, policies, strategies, doctrine, security 
classification frameworks, and capabilities to deter hostilities, demonstrate responsible 
behaviors, and, if necessary, defeat aggression and protect United States interests in 
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space.”348 It suggests a diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) strategic 
approach to counter malicious activities that may threaten U.S. space security.  
An integrated DIME approach to counter increasing Sino-LAC space cooperation 
within the LAC region is necessary to predict, detect, and deter threats to U.S. space 
security. Increased space security focus must be devoted to the evolving Sino-LAC space 
cooperation, which is based on a complex system of civil, commercial, and military 
policies and organizations with ties to the PRC’s geopolitical and economic agenda. If 
Sino-LAC space cooperation results in the Chinese control of regional space infrastructure 
and capabilities, then an opportunity to deter threats against U.S. space security will have 
been lost.  
The NSP stated the Department of Defense shall “detect, characterize, warn, 
attribute, and respond to, in coordination with the Secretary of State and other relevant 
agencies, space-related behaviors and activities that threaten the space interests of the 
United States, its allies, or partners, international peace and security, or the long-term 
sustainability of the space environment.”349 Furthermore, the NSP charged the U.S. Space 
Force as the responsible government agency to pursue national security space objectives.350 
Thus, the U.S. Space Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping regionally 
focused space professionals to lead DIME efforts to counter adversarial space cooperation. 
These military space professionals could have operations, acquisitions, or intelligence 
backgrounds with appropriate regional language, cultural competency, and whole-of-
government approach knowledge; however, these U.S. Space Force positions do not exist. 
These proposed U.S. Space Force liaison officers should be assigned to geographic 
combatant commands, strategically stationed at U.S. embassies around the globe, to 
coordinate with other heads of agencies to consolidate U.S. civil, commercial, and military 
efforts with partner nations. Within the scope of this thesis, U.S. Southern Command could 
 
348 President of the United States, National Space Policy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: President of the United States, 2020), 27, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/National-Space-Policy.pdf. 
349 “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” 30. 
350 “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” 27. 
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divide space liaison efforts in South America across three different regions, the Andean 
states, the Southern Cone, Brazil, and the Guianas, for example.  
U.S. Southern Command priorities are summed into three lines of efforts: 
strengthen partnerships, counter threats, and build our team.351 In his 2020 posture 
statement before the 116th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Southern 
Command Commander Admiral Craig Faller said, “Beijing sees immense value in South 
America’s strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing additional access to 
regional space infrastructure.”352 U.S. Space Force personnel are currently not assigned to 
U.S. embassies, or partner nations, within U.S. Southern Command to lead U.S. space 
security efforts.   
The U.S. military considers the space domain a contested, degraded, and 
operationally limited environment. Chinese counterspace capabilities and threats to U.S. 
space systems are well documented, and the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command 
have prioritized combatting these operational threats. Yet, when the space domain extends 
to international cooperation and away from space operations, U.S. space policy is not 
adequately executed in the LAC region. If the U.S. Space Force plans to accomplish its 
NSP objectives and contribute to U.S. Southern Command’s lines of efforts, it must 
develop space liaison officers to synchronize DIME efforts to combat potential space 




351 “SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort,” U.S. Southern Command, accessed July 21, 2021, 
https://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/. 
352 Posture Statement, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern 
Command). 
83 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acevedo, R., R. Becerra, N. Orihuela, and F. Varela. “Space Activities in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela.” Space Policy 27, no. 3 (August 2011): 174–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.02.003. 
Agencia Bolivariana para Actividades Espaciales [Bolivarian Agency for Space 
Activities]. “A 13 años de cooperación con China, Venezuela continúa su 
crecimiento en el área espacial” [After 13 years of cooperation with China, 
Venezuela continues its growth in the space area]. January 28, 2018. 
http://www.abae.gob.ve/?p=555. 
———. “La cooperación aeroespacial entre China y Venezuela” [Aerospace cooperation 
between China and Venezuela]. July 31, 2017. http://www.abae.gob.ve/?p=885. 
———. “Satélites Miranda y Sucre han aportado más de un millón de imágenes para el 
beneficio del país” [Miranda and Sucre satellites have contributed more than one 
million images for the benefit of the country]. June 17, 2021. 
http://www.abae.gob.ve/?p=2712. 
———. “VENESAT-1.” Accessed May 1, 2021. 
http://www.abae.gob.ve/?page_id=1090. 
———. “Venezuela celebra 8 años de puesta en órbita del satélite Miranda” [Venezuela 
celebrates 8 years since putting the Miranda satellite into orbit]. September 28, 
2020. http://www.abae.gob.ve/?p=1772. 
———. “VRSS-2.” July 17, 2020. http://www.abae.gob.ve/?page_id=1094. 
Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency]. “Historia” [History]. Accessed 
January 21, 2021. https://www.abe.bo/nosotros/historia/. 
———. “Informacion de TKSAT-1” [TKSAT-1 information]. Accessed February 11, 
2021. https://www.abe.bo/actividades/telecomunicaciones/. 
———. “Observación de la Tierra” [Earth observation]. Accessed February 13, 2021. 
https://www.abe.bo/actividades/observacion-de-la-tierra/. 
———. Plan Estratégico 2016-2020 [Strategic Plan 2016-2020]. La Paz, Bolivia: 
Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], 2016. 
https://www.abe.bo/files/planificacion/PlanEstrategicoABE2016-2020.pdf. 
———. “¿Qué es la ABE?” [what is ABE?]. Accessed January 20, 2021. 
https://www.abe.bo/nosotros/que-es-la-abe/. 
84 
Agência Espacial Brasileira [Brazilian Space Agency]. “BRICS.” November 9, 2020. 
https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/cooperacao-
internacional/brics. 
———. “Centros de lançamento” [Launch centers]. March 5, 2020. 
https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/infraestrutura-de-
solo/centros-de-lancamento. 
———. “China.” September 11, 2020. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-
brasileiro/cooperacao-internacional/china. 
———. “First companies to launch non-governmental launches from the Alcântara 
spaceport announced.” April 30, 2021. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-
br/assuntos/noticias/first-companies-to-launch-non-governmental-launches-from-
the-alcantara-spaceport-announced. 
———. “Objetos espaciais Brasileiros” [Brazilian space objects]. June 30, 2021. 
https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/objetos-espaciais-
brasileiros. 
———. “Programa Nacional de Atividades Espaciais” [National Program of Space 
Activities]. August 31, 2021. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-
brasileiro/politica-organizacoes-programa-e-projetos/programa-nacional-de-
atividades-espaciais. 
———. “Satélites.” March 5, 2020. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-
brasileiro/satelites/satelites. 
———. “Transporte espacial” [Space transport]. September 3, 2020. 
https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-brasileiro/transporte-
espacial/transporte-espacial. 
———. “VLS-1.” March 6, 2020. https://www.gov.br/aeb/pt-br/programa-espacial-
brasileiro/transporte-espacial/vls-1. 
Airbus. “PerúSAT-1 Mission.” Accessed November 16, 2020. 
https://www.airbus.com/space/earth-observation/perusat.html. 
———. “Peruvian Government: ‘Satellite Investment Recovered after First Year of 
Operations.’” December 7, 2017. https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-
releases/en/2017/12/Perusat-first-year-of-operations.html. 
American Enterprise Institute. “China Global Investment Tracker.” Accessed September 
17, 2020. https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/. 
85 
Andina. “Coronavirus: satélite PerúSAT-1 monitorea situación de cuarentena” 
[Coronavirus: PeruSAT-1 satellite monitors quarantine situation]. May 18, 2020. 
https://andina.pe/agencia/noticia-coronavirus-satelite-perusat1-monitorea-
situacion-cuarentena-797793.aspx. 
Aorpimai, Manop. “APSCO IGMA Network.” Fourteenth meeting of the UNOOSA ICG, 
Bengaluru, India, December 9, 2019. 
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/icg/2019/icg14/WGS/icg14_wgs_16.pdf. 
Argentina Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación [Argentina Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation]. “CONAE cumple 30 años afianzando la 
tecnología espacial argentina” [CONAE celebrates 30 years strengthening 
Argentine space technology]. May 28, 2021. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/conae-cumple-30-anos-afianzando-la-
tecnologia-espacial-argentina-0. 
ARSAT. “Satelital” [Satellite]. Accessed July 26, 2021. 
https://www.arsat.com.ar/satelital/. 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. “About Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization.” June 6, 2018. 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/WhatisAPSCO/2018-06-06/33-144-
1.shtml. 
———. “APSCO Brochure.” 2018. 
http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20180703/201807031400255205.pdf. 
———. Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. 2005. 
http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20180525/2018052510341620388.pdf. 
———. “Data Sharing Service Platform.” July 6, 2018. 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/DataSharingServiceNetwork/2018-07-
06/62-184-1.shtml. 
———. Development Vision 2030 of The Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 
(APSCO). Beijing, China: Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, 2018. 
http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20190304/2019030411022230805.pdf. 
———. “Disaster Monitoring and Mitigation Network.” July 4, 2018. 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/DisasterMonitoringNetwork/2018-07-
04/45-173-1.shtml. 




———. “Member States-APSCO.” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/channel/Member_States/25.shtml. 
Bartholomew, Carolyn, and Robin Cleveland. 2019 Report to Congress of the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, DC: U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019. 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf. 
Bolivia. “Rumbo a China 64 técnicos Bolivianos para capacitarse en el manejo del 
satélites” [64 Bolivian technicians head to China for satellite training]. October 
29, 2012. https://www.bolivia.com/tecnologia/visionarios/sdi/49226/rumbo-a-
china-64-tecnicos-bolivianos-para-capacitarse-en-el-manejo-del-satelites. 
Bowe, Alexander. China’s Position on a Code of Conduct in Space. Washington, DC: 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017. 
https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-code-conduct-space. 
Brazil Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “11th BRICS Summit - Brasília Declaration.” 
November 14, 2019. https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-
releases/11th-brics-summit-brasilia-declaration. 
———. “What Is BRICS?” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
http://brics2019.itamaraty.gov.br/en/about-brics/what-is-brics. 
Caballero León, Carlos. “PeruSAT-1: La carrera espacial Peruana con tareas pendientes” 
[PeruSAT-1: The Peruvian space race with pending tasks]. Gestión, September 9, 
2019. https://gestion.pe/opinion/perusat-1-la-carrera-espacial-peruana-con-tareas-
pendientes-noticia/. 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “UN and CD Membership.” Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, July 14, 2015. https://media.nti.org/pdfs/apmuncd_8.pdf. 
Central Intelligence Agency. “Argentina - The World Factbook.” August 23, 2021. 
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/argentina/. 
———. “Brazil - The World Factbook.” August 24, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-
world-factbook/countries/brazil/. 
———. “Peru - The World Factbook.” March 5, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-
factbook/countries/peru/#geography. 
———. “Venezuela - The World Factbook.” June 29, 2021. https://www.cia.gov/the-
world-factbook/countries/venezuela/. 
87 
Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara [Alcantara Launch Center]. “História do CLA” 
[CLA history]. Accessed September 3, 2021. 
https://www2.fab.mil.br/cla/index.php/historias. 
Chauvin, Lucien O, and Barbara Fraser. “Beijing’s South American Gambit.” Nature 
569, no. 179 (May 9, 2019): 3. 
China Great Wall Industry Corporation. “CGWIC Helps Receipt of GF-2 Satellite Data 
in Venezuela.” Aerospace China 18, no. 2 (Summer 2017). 
http://www.aerospacechina.org/EN/Y2017/V18/I2/57. 
———. “China Successfully Launched TKSAT-1 Communications Satellite.” December 
27, 2013. http://www.cgwic.com/news/2013/1227_Launched_TKSAT-
1_Communications_Satellite.html. 
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Basic Information about China-CELAC Forum.” 
April 2016. 
http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/ltjj_1/P020161207421177845816.pdf. 
———. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2008. Beijing, 
China: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008. https://china.usc.edu/chinas-
policy-paper-latin-america-and-caribbean. 
———. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean 2016. Beijing, 
China: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016. 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml. 
China State Council. China’s National Defense in the New Era. Beijing, China: China 
State Council, 2019. 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc
6d08408f502283d.html. 




Global Times. “China Will Carry out Cooperation with Venezuela Even If the Situation 
Changes.” Accessed April 1, 2021. 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1208259.shtml. 
Chinese Academy of Sciences South America Center for Astronomy. “Overview – 
CASSACA.” Accessed August 24, 2020. http://www.cassaca.org/en/news/. 
88 
Cleveland, Robin, and Carolyn Bartholomew. 2020 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, DC: U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2020. 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
12/2020_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales [National Commission of Space 
Activities]. “Acceso al espacio” [Access to space]. April 4, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/acceso-al-espacio. 
———. “Antecedentes” [Background]. June 1, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/antecedentes-1. 
———. “Aquarius.” March 2, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/misiones-espaciales/sac-d. 
———. “Centro Espacial Manuel Belgrano” [Manuel Belgrano Space Center]. May 30, 
2018. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/centro-
espacial-manuel-belgrano. 
———. “Centro Espacial Punta Indio” [Punta Indio Space Center]. May 30, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/centro-espacial-
punta-indio. 
———. “La CONAE inició la revisión estratégica del Plan Espacial Nacional 2021-
2030” [CONAE initiated the strategic review of the National Space Plan 2021-
2030]. June 18, 2021. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/la-conae-inicio-la-
revision-estrategica-del-plan-espacial-nacional-2021-2030. 
———. “Misiones cumplidas” [Accomplished missions]. March 2, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/misiones-espaciales/misiones-
cumplidas. 
———. “Misiones satelitales” [Satellite missions]. March 1, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/misiones-espaciales. 
———. “Objetivos” [Objectives]. March 1, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/misiones-
espaciales/saocom/objetivos. 
———. “Plan espacial nacional” [National space plan]. May 30, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/plan-espacial. 
———. “Presencia argentina en la misión espacial China a Marte” [Argentine presence 




———. “SAOCOM.” March 1, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/misiones-espaciales/saocom. 
———. “Uso del espacio ultraterrestre” [Use of outer space]. May 30, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/plan-espacial/uso-del-espacio-
ultraterrestre. 
———. “Usos” [Uses]. June 1, 2018. 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ciencia/conae/centros-y-estaciones/usos-0. 
Comisión Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo Aeroespacial [National Commission of 
Aerospace Research and Development]. “Centro nacional de operaciones de 
imágenes satelitales” [National center for satellite imagery operations]. Accessed 
February 11, 2021. https://www.gob.pe/10396-comision-nacional-de-
investigacion-y-desarrollo-aeroespacial-centro-nacional-de-operaciones-de-
imagenes-satelitales. 
———. “Ingeniero Peruano dicta curso internacional sobre satélites a países miembros 
de APSCO” [Peruvian engineer gives international course on satellites to APSCO 
member countries]. October 13, 2020. 
https://www.gob.pe/institucion/conida/noticias/307090-ingeniero-peruano-dicta-
curso-internacional-sobre-satelites-a-paises-miembros-de-apsco. 
———. “Proyectos e investigaciones” [Projects and research]. December 21, 2020. 
https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/1489772/Brochure%20FINAL.pdf
.pdf. 
———. “¿Qué hacemos?” [What do we do?]. November 17, 2020. 
https://www.gob.pe/4108-comision-nacional-de-investigacion-y-desarrollo-
aeroespacial-que-hacemos. 
Daniel Gallas and Daniele Palumbo. “What’s Gone Wrong with Brazil’s Economy?” 
BBC News, May 26, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48386415. 
Delgado-López, Laura M. “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation: A Smart Move.” 
Space Policy 28, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 7–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.12.009. 
Deng Xiaoci. “BRICS Countries Agree to Enhance Cooperation in Remote Sensing 
Satellite Data Sharing to Cope with Climate Change, Major Disasters - Global 
Times.” Global Times, August 18, 2021. 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231874.shtml. 




Emily Achtenberg and Rebel Currents. “Financial Sovereignty or A New Dependency? 
How China Is Remaking Bolivia.” North American Congress on Latin America, 
August 10, 2017. https://nacla.org/blog/2017/08/11/financial-sovereignty-or-new-
dependency-how-china-remaking-bolivia. 
Esper, Mark T. “As Prepared Remarks by Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper at the 
Munich Security Conference.” U.S. Department of Defense, February 15, 2020. 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2085577/as-
prepared-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-mark-t-esper-at-the-munich-security/. 
Faller. Posture Statement, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Craig S. Faller, Commander, 
U.S. Southern Command), n.d. 
Filho, José Monserrat. “Brazilian-Chinese Space Cooperation: An Analysis.” Space 
Policy 13, no. 2 (May 1997): 153–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0265-
9646(97)00002-7. 
Froehlich, A., D.A.A. Soria, and E. De Marchi. Space Supporting Latin America: Latin 
America’s Emerging Space Middle Powers. Springer International Publishing, 
2020. 
Garcia, Simon. “Venezuela and China Share Knowledge on Space Cooperation.” 
Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela [Venezuelan Government], July 3, 2019. 
http://www.mppre.gob.ve/en/2019/07/03/venezuela-china-space-cooperation/. 
———. “Venezuela Exhorts to Respect the Principle of Non-Militarization of the 
Space.” Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela [Venezuelan Government], October 
25, 2018. http://www.mppre.gob.ve/en/2018/10/25/venezuela-exhorts-to-respect-
the-principle-of-non-militarization-of-the-space/. 
Garvin, Matthew B. “Launching Latin America: International and Domestic Factors in 
National Space Programs.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44569. 
Geospatial World. “Peruvian Chasqui I Satellite Was Launched into Space.” February 7, 
2014. https://www.geospatialworld.net/news/peruvian-chasqui-i-satellite-was-
launched-into-space/. 
Gillespie, Patrick. “China and Argentina Resume Joint Venture for Space Exploration.” 
Bloomberg, August 7, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-
07/china-and-argentina-resume-joint-venture-for-space-exploration. 
———. “Covid Layoff Ban Backfires in One of World’s Worst Job Markets.” 
Bloomberg, December 10, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
12-10/covid-layoff-ban-backfires-in-one-of-world-s-worst-job-markets. 
91 
Gobierno de México [Mexican Government]. “Invitan a AEM a ser miembro permanente 
de la APSCO” [AEM is invited to become a permanent APSCO member]. 
Accessed January 11, 2021. http://www.gob.mx/aem/prensa/invitan-a-aem-a-ser-
miembro-permanente-de-la-apsco-199663?idiom=es. 
Goñi, Uki. “Argentinian Congress Approves Deal with China on Satellite Space Station.” 
The Guardian, February 26, 2015. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-
satellite-space-station. 
Graham, William. “Russian Dnepr Conducts Record Breaking 32 Satellite Haul.” NASA 
Space Flight, November 21, 2013. 
https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/11/russian-dnepr-record-breaking-32-
satellite-haul/. 
Green, Mark. “China’s Debt Diplomacy.” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/. 
Gunter’s Space Page. “Chasqui 1.” Accessed February 12, 2021. 
https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/chasqui-1.htm. 
Guo, Xiaozhong, Pengqi Gao, Ming Shen, Datao Yang, Huanhuan Yu, Tong Liu, Jiawei 
Li, and You Zhao. “Introduction to APOSOS Project: 15 Cm Aperture Electro-
Optical Telescopes to Track Space Objects.” Advances in Space Research 65, no. 
8 (April 15, 2020): 1990–2002. 
Harding, Robert C. “Emerging Space Powers of Latin America: Argentina and Brazil.” In 
Yearbook on Space Policy 2012/2013: Space in a Changing World, edited by 
Cenan Al-Ekabi, Blandina Baranes, Peter Hulsroj, and Arne Lahcen, 221–31. 
Vienna: Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-1827-6_6. 
———. Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and 
Development on the Final Frontier. New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Harvey, Brian, Henk H.F. Smid, and Theo Pirard. Emerging Space Powers: The New 
Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South-America. Springer Praxis 
Books. Chichester, UK: Praxis, 2010. 
Henry, Caleb. “Argentine Operator Arsat Revives Plans for Third Satellite.” SpaceNews, 
March 19, 2020. https://spacenews.com/argentine-operator-arsat-revives-plans-
for-third-satellite/. 
———. “Brazil to Order Second Dual Civil-Military Communications Satellite.” 
SpaceNews, April 10, 2019. https://spacenews.com/brazil-to-order-second-dual-
civil-military-communications-satellite/. 
92 
———. “Solar Array Problem Killed Venezuela’s VeneSat-1, Officials Confirm.” 
SpaceNews, March 30, 2020. https://spacenews.com/solar-array-problem-killed-
venezuelas-venesat-1-officials-confirm/. 
Hsiang, Antonio C. “Why Latin American Populism Is Bad News for China.” The 
Diplomat, August 13, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/why-latin-american-
populism-is-bad-news-for-china/. 
Hulse, Janie. China’s Expansion Into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina’s 
Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National 
Security: Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007. 
https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA471923. 
Imbert, Mariano. “China-Venezuela Space Cooperation Benefits and Review.” 
Aerospace China 17, no. 4 (October 20, 2016): 47–55. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas [National Institute of Statistics]. “Aspectos 
geográficos” [Geographical aspects]. April 2020. 
https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/bolivia/aspectos-geograficos/. 
———. “Población y hechos vitales” [Population and vital facts]. Accessed March 10, 
2021. https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/censos-y-proyecciones-de-poblacion-
sociales/. 
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais [National Institute for Space Research]. 
“Amazon Mission.” Accessed September 1, 2021. 
http://www.inpe.br/amazonia1/en/. 
———. “CBERS FAQ.” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
http://www.inpe.br/faq/index.php?pai=17. 
———. “CBERS História.” February 5, 2018. http://www.cbers.inpe.br/sobre/index.php. 
———. “Perguntas Frequentes” [Common Questions]. Accessed September 2, 2021. 
http://www.inpe.br/faq/index.php?pai=17. 
———. “Satellite Tracking and Control Center.” May 24, 2018. 
http://www.inpe.br/crc/ccs.php. 
———. “SCD-1.” Accessed September 2, 2021. 
http://www.inpe.br/scd1/site_scd/scd1/osatelite.htm. 
———. “SCD-l completa 28 anos em operação” [SCD-1 completes 28 years of 
operations]. August 20, 2021. https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-
noticias/satelite-de-coleta-de-dados-1-scd-l-completa-28-anos-em-operacao. 
93 
INVAP. “Communication Satellites.” Accessed July 26, 2021. 
https://www.invap.com.ar/en/divisions/aerospace/communication-satellites/. 
———. “Scientific Application Satellites.” Accessed July 26, 2021. 
https://www.invap.com.ar/en/divisions/aerospace/scientific-application-satellites/. 
InvestChile. “Astronomy: China to Install Megaproject in Chile.” March 2019. 
http://blog.investchile.gob.cl/astronomy-china-to-install-megaproject-in-chile. 
Jayme, Jonathan. “Cerimônia marca inauguração das instalações do centro de operações 
espaciais” [Ceremony marks the inauguration of the space operations center]. 





Jones, Andrew. “China Launches Chang’e-4 Spacecraft for Pioneering Lunar Far Side 
Landing Mission.” SpaceNews, December 7, 2018. https://spacenews.com/china-
launches-change-4-spacecraft-for-pioneering-lunar-far-side-landing-mission/. 
Jornada. “STK llegará a su ‘límite práctico ocupacional’ hasta fin de año” [STK will 
reach its ‘practical occupational limit’ by the end of the year]. February 19, 2019. 
https://jornada.com.bo/stk-llegara-a-su-limite-practico-ocupacional-hasta-fin-de-
ano/. 
Juan Pons. “Brazil Expands Strategic Alliance with India to Balance China’s Influence.” 
Atalayar, March 5, 2021. https://atalayar.com/en/content/brazil-expands-strategic-
alliance-india-balance-chinas-influence. 
Kelly, Sean. “Why the US Is Partnering with Brazil in Space Race against China.” The 
Hill, April 2, 2019. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/436967-why-the-us-
is-partnering-with-brazil-in-space-race-against-china. 
Kirschner, Noelani. “Under Maduro, Nearly All Venezuelans Live in Poverty.” 
ShareAmerica, August 3, 2020. https://share.america.gov/under-maduro-nearly-
all-venezuelans-live-in-poverty/. 
Klinger, Julie Michelle. “A Brief History of Outer Space Cooperation Between Latin 
America and China.” Journal of Latin American Geography 17, no. 2 (2018): 46–
83. https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2018.0022. 
Kulu, Erik. “Chasqui-I.” Nanosats Database, March 22, 2020. 
https://www.nanosats.eu/sat/chasqui-i.html. 
94 
Lee, Victor Robert. “China Builds Space-Monitoring Base in the Americas.” The 
Diplomat, May 24, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-
monitoring-base-in-the-americas/. 




Luna, Patricia. “South American Leaders Launch New Bloc to Replace Unasur.” 
Associated Press, March 22, 2019. 
https://apnews.com/3cc29c66207249e18871ce8daeb56a1e. 
Mann, Adam. “China’s Chang’e 5 Mission: Sampling the Lunar Surface.” Space, 
December 10, 2020. https://www.space.com/change-5-mission.html. 
Marcondes, Danilo, Pedro Henrique, and Batista Barbosa. “Brazil-China Defense 
Cooperation: A Strategic Partnership in the Making?” Journal of Latin American 
Geography 17, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 140–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2018.0025. 
Martín Canales Romero, Juan. “Sounding Rocket Program in Peru.” In SpaceOps 2012 
Conference, 1–7. SpaceOps Conferences. American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, 2012. https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2012-1275893. 
Martínez, Gabriel, and Guillermo Rus. “Cae un 55% la inversión en el sector espacial 
argentino” [Investment in the Argentine space sector falls by 55%]. Motor 
Economico [Economic Motor], November 2016. 
http://motoreconomico.com.ar/cruda-realidad/cae-un-55-la-inversin-en-el-sector-
espacial-argentino. 
Matignon, Louis de Gouyon. “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space.” Space Legal Issues, May 8, 2019. 
https://www.spacelegalissues.com/treaty-on-the-prevention-of-the-placement-of-
weapons-in-outer-space-the-threat-or-use-of-force-against-outer-space-objects/. 
Michael Zarate. “‘Argentina Will Join the Belt and Road Initiative’ —Interview with the 




Miltersen, Rob. “Chinese Aerospace Along the Belt and Road.” Air University, China 
Aerospace Studies Institute, June 15, 2020, 13. 
Moltz, James Clay. Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and 
International Risks. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
95 
———. “Brazil’s Space Program: Dreaming with Its Feet on the Ground.” Space Policy, 
Brazil’s space program, 33 (2015): 13–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2015.05.001. 
Muñoz, Omar Valdez. “ABE cuenta con equipos para análisis de imágenes de satélites de 
observación de la Tierra” [ABE has equipment for analyzing Earth observation 
satellite images]. Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], 
September 28, 2018. https://www.abe.bo/abe-cuenta-equipos-analisis-imagenes-
satelites-observacion-la-tierra/. 
———. “Bolivia parece tener argumentos para afrontar la misión del segundo Túpac 
Katari” [Bolivia appears to have arguments for a second Túpac Katari mission]. 
Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], November 14, 2018. 
https://www.abe.bo/bolivia-parece-argumentos-afrontar-la-mision-del-segundo-
tupac-katari/. 
———. “Breve resumen del origen y actualidad de la Agencia Boliviana Espacial” [Brief 
summary of the origin and present of the Bolivian Space Agency]. Agencia 
Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], March 21, 2019. 
https://www.abe.bo/breve-resumen-del-origen-actualidad-la-agencia-boliviana-
espacial/. 
———. “Cinco años del lanzamiento del satélite Túpac Katari” [Five years since the 
launch of the Túpac Katari satellite]. Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space 
Agency], January 2, 2019. https://www.abe.bo/cinco-anos-del-lanzamiento-del-
satelite-tupac-katari-2/. 
———. “El embajador Huang Yazhong en Bolivia asiste a la ceremonia de inicio del 
proyecto de reforma de la estación terrestre de satélite Boliviano” [Ambassador 
Huang Yazhong attends the opening ceremony of the project to reform Bolivia’s 
satellite ground station]. Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], 
January 25, 2020. https://www.abe.bo/el-embajador-huang-yazhong-en-bolivia-
asiste-a-la-ceremonia-de-inicio-del-proyecto-de-reforma-de-la-estacion-terrestre-
de-satelite-boliviano/. 
———. “Lanzamiento del servicio de estación terrena” [Launch of Earth station 
services]. Agencia Boliviana Espacial [Bolivian Space Agency], January 10, 
2020. https://www.abe.bo/lanzamiento-del-servicio-de-estacion-terrena/. 
Nie, Mingyan. “Asian Space Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization: An Appraisal of Critical Legal Challenges in the Belt and Road 
Space Initiative Context.” Space Policy 47 (February 1, 2019): 224–31. 
96 
Noticias de Universidades de Bolivia [Bolivian Universities News]. “Envían diez 
becarios a China a capacitarse en operación de telepuertos para manejo de 
satélite” [Ten fellows fly to China to train in satellite management]. July 26, 2013. 
https://www.universidadesbol.com/2013/07/envian-diez-becarios-china-
capacitarse.html. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General.” 
January 31, 2013. https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/124/. 
———. “Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty.” Accessed 
August 23, 2020. https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-
prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/. 
Ommati, Marcos. “From Riches to Rags, the History of the Venezuelan Crisis.” Diálogo 
Americas, July 26, 2019. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/from-riches-to-
rags-the-history-of-the-venezuelan-crisis/. 
Ouyang, Amy, ed. APSCO Quarterly Report. Beijing, China: Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization, 2016. 
http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20180309/2019030610192821583.pdf. 
Pena, J.A., and T. Yumin. “The Role of Venezuelan Space Technology in Promoting 
Development in Latin America.” International Archives of the Photogrammetry, 
Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences XLII-2/W7 (September 13, 
2017): 851–56. https://doi.org/10.5194/isprs-archives-XLII-2-W7-851-2017. 
Pollpeter, Kevin, Michael Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The Creation of the PLA 
Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space 
Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2058.html. 
President of the United States. National Space Policy of the United States of America. 
Washington, DC: President of the United States, 2020. 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/National-
Space-Policy.pdf. 
Reuters. “IMF and Argentina Cite Progress in $45 Bln Debt Talks.” July 13, 2021. 
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/imf-cites-progress-debt-talks-with-
argentina-2021-07-13/. 
Rohter, Larry. “Brazil’s Soaring Space-Age Ambitions Are Shy of Cash and Sapped by 




Sarang, Mehak. “Changing Objectives in Achieving Space Sovereignty in Latin 
America.” In Space Fostering Latin American Societies: Developing the Latin 
American Continent through Space, Part 1, 125–33. Springer International 
Publishing, 2020. 
Sarli, Bruno Victorino, Marco Antonio Cabero Zabalaga, Alejandro Lopez Telgie, and 
Universidad de Concepción. “Review of Space Activities in South America.” 
Journal of Aeronautical History 8 (September 11, 2018): 208–32. 
Selding, Peter B. de. “Airbus Beats Crowded Field To Build Peru a Reconnaissance 
Satellite.” SpaceNews, April 25, 2014. https://spacenews.com/40333military-
space-quarterly-airbus-beats-crowded-field-to-build-peru-a/. 
———. “Prospective Bidders Line up for Bolivian Imaging Satellite Program.” 
SpaceNews, June 6, 2014. https://spacenews.com/40815prospective-bidders-line-
up-for-bolivian-imaging-satellite-program/. 
Seligman, Lara. “U.S. Military Warns of Threat From Chinese-Run Space Station in 
Argentina.” Foreign Policy, February 8, 2019. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-chinese-
run-space-station-in-argentina/. 
Serna, Angel E. “The U.S.-Latin America Space Cooperation Equation.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2018. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58368. 
Shi Yinglun. “Experts Hail China-Brazil Satellite Program as Model for BRICS Sci-Tech 
Endeavors.” XinhuaNet, November 12, 2019. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/12/c_138549867.htm. 
SpaceNews. “Vega To Launch Peruvian Imaging Satellite Along with Skybox Craft.” 
March 25, 2015. https://spacenews.com/vega-to-launch-peruvian-imaging-
satellite-along-with-skybox-craft/. 
Stokes, Mark, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein, and Ian Easton. China’s Space and 
Counterspace Capabilities and Activities. Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 
2020. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf. 
Telebras. “Conheça o SGDC” [Meet SGDC]. Accessed September 2, 2021. 
https://www.telebras.com.br/telebras-sat/conheca-o-sgdc/. 
Thales. “The Brazilian SGDC Dual-Use Communication Satellite Is Ready to Be Shipped 




The Dialogue. “China-Latin America Finance Database.” Accessed August 17, 2020. 
https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/. 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs Republicans. “China Regional Snapshot: 
Space.” March 16, 2021. https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-
snapshot-space/. 
Time. “The U.S. and China Are Battling for Influence in Latin America, and the 
Pandemic Has Raised the Stakes.” Accessed February 26, 2021. 
https://time.com/5936037/us-china-latin-america-influence/. 
The World Bank. “GDP (Current US$).” Accessed August 31, 2021. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_des
c=true. 
———. “The World Bank in Argentina.” April 5, 2021. 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/argentina/overview. 
Trinkunas, Harold. “Testing the Limits of China and Brazil’s Partnership.” Brookings, 
July 20, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/testing-the-limits-of-china-and-
brazils-partnership/. 
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space.” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. 
———. “Space Law Treaties and Principles.” Accessed August 23, 2020. 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html. 
United States Department of State. “U.S. Relations With Bolivia.” January 19, 2021. 
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-bolivia/. 
U.S. Air Force. Counterspace Operations. AFDP 3-14. Maxwell AFB, AL: Curtis E. 
Lemay Center, 2018. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-
14/AFDP-3-14-Counterspace-Ops.pdf. 
U.S. Southern Command. “SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort.” Accessed July 21, 2021. 
https://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/. 
Vargas-Cuentas, Natalia I, and Avid Roman-Gonzalez. “The Space Technology to 
Solving Societal Issues in Bolivia: An Overview.” In International Astronautical 
Congress - IAC 2017, 1–8. Adelaide, Australia, 2017. https://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/hal-01640966. 
Wang, Christoph. “Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” Green Belt and Road 
Initiative Center. Accessed September 14, 2020. https://green-bri.org/countries-
of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri. 
99 
Wight, Andrew. “China, Eyeing Bolivia’s Lithium Riches, Helps Country into Space.” 
The Sydney Morning Herald, February 20, 2018. 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/south-america/china-eyeing-bolivia-s-lithium-
riches-helps-country-into-space-20180220-p4z0yz.html. 
Wilson, Jordan. China’s Military Agreements with Argentina: A Potential New Phase in 
China- Latin America Defense Relations. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, 2015. 
Wood, Peter, Taylor A. Lee, and Alex Stone. China’s Ground Segment: Building the 





Wright, Jerry. “Station Spacewalkers Deploy Nanosatellite, Install and Retrieve Science.” 
NASA, August 17, 2014. http://www.nasa.gov/content/station-spacewalkers-
deploy-nanosatellite-install-and-retrieve-science. 
XinhuaNet. “Xi Focus: Building a Peace-Loving World-Class Military.” August 1, 2021. 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-08/01/c_1310101198.htm. 
Zhang, Pepe. “Belt and Road in Latin America: A Regional Game Changer?” Atlantic 
Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, October 8, 2019, 12. 
Zhao, Yun. “The 2002 Space Cooperation Protocol between China and Brazil: An 









INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
